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In July, 2013 Malawi enacted a new Companies Act [Act No. 15 of 2013] replacing the old 
Companies Act 19 of 1984. The Companies Act, 1984 was basically an adoption of the English 
Companies Act, 1948 and in line with the English law, it regulated distributions through the 
classical capital maintenance rule. In contrast, the new Companies Act, 2013 which came into 
force in May, 2016 has jettisoned the capital maintenance rule. As an alternative to that rule, the 
Act has introduced for the first time in Malawian company law edifice, the concept of the 
solvency test.   
Jurisdictions that have adopted the solvency test in their company law essentially have 
done so on the basis that company law should focus on the core risk at stake – company 
insolvency, and that it is meaningless to state that creditors look to the company’s capital as a 
trust fund out which their debts would be settled. Despite having the same theoretical basis for 
adopting the solvency test, the manner in which the solvency test is defined and applied in a 
particular statute has significant effects on whether in its operation, the test affords adequate 
protection to the interests of creditors. 
This research examines the definition and application of the solvency test under the 
Companies Act, 2013 so as to determine whether in its operation as a financial restriction for 
distributions and other company transactions, it will afford adequate protection to creditors. It 
follows the approach used by Professor Kathleen Van der Linde in her analysis of the solvency 
and liquidity approach in the Companies Act, 2008. Thus, it analyses the Malawian law by 
focusing on the two separate elements of the test (equity solvency and balance sheet solvency) as 
well as other aspects of the test which are likely to raise legal interpretation issues.      
The twin solvency test adopted in different jurisdictions ordinarily varies in its balance 
sheet solvency element. Some jurisdictions such as South Africa and New Zealand utilise the net 
assets approach in their balance sheet test. Others such as New York and Delaware still 
emphasise on the trust fund doctrine and thus utilise stated capital in their balance sheet test.       
Malawi is a stated capital/surplus jurisdiction. Its new solvency based regime still focuses 
on the meaningless trust fund doctrine. The new solvency test approach in Malawi is incomplete 
and inadequate to fully protect creditors against opportunistic shareholder behaviour. A number 
of recommendations are made for an effective solvency test approach that will afford adequate 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION AND STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
Every statute that regulates the incorporation and operation of companies includes some 
provisions protecting the interests of creditors against unsafe distributions of company assets to 
shareholders1. These provisions ordinarily contain the following rules: (a) mandatory disclosure 
rules, especially in relation to financial performance of the company; (b) detailed legal capital 
rules that throughout the life of the company govern the maintenance of its share capital and 
other quasi-capital reserves; and (c) broad solvency based standards underpinned by personal 
liability attaching to directors or controllers2. The third rule, the incorporation of solvency based 
standards in company law, as a strategy for protecting the interests of creditors is a feature of 
recent company law reforms that have resulted in the discarding of long outmoded legal capital 
rules in some common law jurisdictions3. 
Jurisdictions that have adopted the solvency standards (solvency test) have essentially 
done so on the same theoretical justifications. The argument is that, unlike traditional legal 
capital rules, the solvency test gives advance recognition to the ultimate priority that creditors 
enjoy over shareholders upon dissolution of the company by preventing the company from 
favouring its shareholders through partial liquidation and it also addresses the fundamental 
expectation of creditors to be paid on time4. The Republic of Malawi on 20th May, 2016 became 
the latest jurisdiction to adopt the solvency test when its new Companies Act 15 of 2013 
(‘Companies Act, 2013’) came into force. Without contesting the theoretical basis upon which 
the solvency test is adopted, this paper seeks to examine the solvency test approach as enacted in 
the new Malawian Companies Act so as to assess whether, in its operation as a financial 
restriction to distributions, it will provide adequate protection to creditors. 
This chapter gives a background to the study. It gives a brief synopsis of the literature 
review on the traditional legal capital rules and the company law reforms that have seen the 
adoption of the solvency test as an alternative to the legal capital rules. In this regard, it 
discusses briefly the position in the United States of America (‘US’) as a leading jurisdiction on 
                                                          
1 See generally R Kraakman et al The Anatomy of Corporate Law: A Comparative and Functional Approach 2ed 
(2009) chapter 5.  
2 E Ferran and L Chan Ho Principles of Corporate Finance Law 2ed (2014) 71. 
3 For example the United States of America effected amendments in 1980 to its Model Business Corporation Act 
which resulted in the jettisoning of traditional legal capital concepts. See generally Manning and Hanks Legal 
Capital Being a Concise Practical Exposition with Illustrative Examples 3ed (1990).  
4 K Van Der Linde ‘The solvency and liquidity approach in the Companies Act 2008’ (2009) 2 TSAR 224 at 226.  
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the reforms to the legal capital rules in company law. It also discusses briefly the unique position 
of the United Kingdom (‘UK’) which to a large extent still maintains the obsolete legal capital 
rules. It then discusses the introduction of the solvency test in Malawi and why there is need to 
undertake a study on the operation of the solvency test in Malawi. Finally, it gives a layout of the 
chapters in this paper.     
 
1.1 BACKGROUND 
1.1.1 The concept of legal capital 
Legal capital can best be described as a broad concept that embraces the rules relating to the 
raising of capital through share issuance, the maintenance of share capital, and the returning of 
value to shareholders in circumstances that do not infringe the maintenance of capital 
requirements5.The development of the legal capital concept in traditional company law can be 
traced from the conflict that has always existed between two stakeholders in a company 
(creditors and shareholders). The interests of creditors and shareholders are likely to conflict 
whenever assets of shareholders are to be committed to the company’s treasury and whenever 
assets are to be distributed to shareholders from the corporate treasury6. Thus, the legal apparatus 
built by the common law and statute around the concept of legal capital was fundamentally 
aimed at striking a partial accommodation of that conflict of interests7.  
A discussion of the legal capital rules logically begins by looking at the rules on raising of 
capital through share issuance (pay in rules)8. The common law as developed in the UK, 
established a rule that every share in a limited company having share capital must have a fixed 
nominal or par value9. Shareholders could not be allotted shares at an amount less than the par 
value10. This rule was thought to be important because it allowed creditors to ascertain the fixed 
and certain amount of capital that they were entitled to regard as their security11. This 
requirement for shares to have a par or nominal value was the rule in most common law 
                                                          
5 E Ferran and L Chan op cit (n2) 71. 
6 Shareholders like to minimize the amount of assets they must contribute into the company in exchange for shares 
while maximizing the distribution of company assets to them. Creditors on the other hand like to do the opposite. 
See, B Manning Legal Capital 2ed (1981) 1. 
7 Ibid. 
8 The discussion in this background only focuses on the concept of par value shares. It is duly appreciated that the 
pay in requirements for shareholders are many and a discussion of such nature may be a thesis on its own. 
9 Ooregum Gold Mining Co. of India –v- Roper 1892 AC 125. See also the UK Companies Act, 2006, section 542. 




countries including the US12. However, around 1912 legal capital rules in the US eventually 
authorized the company constitution to have provisions providing for shares with no par value13. 
Shareholders subscribing for shares in a company whose constitution allowed for authorized 
capital to have no par value shares would simply be required to pay the consideration as declared 
by the board of the company14. In this regard, traditional US legal capital rules permitted 
companies to decide whether the authorized share capital would be divided into par value shares 
or not15. Notably, despite the eventual philosophical divide between the UK and the US, the 
discussion in the literature on the legal capital rules relating to the raising of capital through 
share issuance converged on this important critic of par value shares: 
‘The concept of par value of share capital might have significance if it gave some indication of the market 
value of a company’s assets. However, it usually does not and instead may be a source of confusion….  
As time goes on, the overall net worth of the company and the value of individual shares in the 
company depend on the success of the company’s business ventures and also on the general economic 
factors. In practice, the par value of a share commonly bears little relation to the price at which it trades in 
the market.’16 [Sic]  
In addition to the rules on raising capital through share issuance, the legal capital concept 
provided rules on the maintenance of share capital. The capital maintenance doctrine developed 
from the common law cases of Trevor –v- Whitworth17 and Re Exchange Banking Company, 
Flitcroft’s Case18. It essentially states that the issued share capital of a company, whatever the 
amount, is a guarantee fund intended for the protection of creditors which must be maintained in 
the sense that the company is not allowed to return its issued share capital to its shareholders 
unless authorized by statute19. The settled view is that the capital maintenance rule which the 
Lords recognized in Trevor –v- Whitworth was borne out of concern for the position of creditors 
in the wake of the development of the concept of limited liability of shareholders20. The concept 
of limited liability of shareholders developed as one of the legal consequences of the principle of 
separate legal personality enunciated in the leading English case of Salomon –v- Salomon & Co 
                                                          
12 Other countries such as New Zealand and South Africa also followed the UK position.  
13 Manning and Hanks op cit (n3) 29.    
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid 26-30. 
16 E Ferran and L Chan Ho op cit (n2) 72. See also B Manning op cit (n6) 23 and HS Cilliers et al Cilliers & 
Benade: Corporate Law 3ed (2000) 222 - 224.  
17 1887 (12) App Cas 409 (HL).  
18 1882 (21) Ch D 518, 533–534. 
19 FHI Cassim ‘The Reform of Company Law and the Capital Maintenance Concept’ (2005) SALJ 285.  
20 B McCabe ‘The Desirability of a Share Buy-Back Power’ (1991) 3 Issue 1 Bond Law Review 117. See also FHI 
Cassim op cit (n19) 284. 
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Ltd21. Shareholders are in principle not liable for the debts and liabilities of the company22. This 
entails that the claims of creditors are confined to the assets of the company, thus, they cannot 
obtain satisfaction of their debts from the personal assets of the shareholders of the company23. 
Consequently, a number of rules were developed at common law. Ciliers and Benade state 
that important rules of the common law were that a company may not buy back its own shares; 
may only pay dividends out of profits and may not issue shares at a discount24. Apart from the 
common law rules, jurisdictions enacted statutory provisions that further entrenched the capital 
maintenance doctrine25.  
However, stemming from the criticism of par value shares highlighted earlier26, the 
relevance of the capital maintenance rules was questioned. The argument was that it was a 
fiction to state that creditors dealt with a company on the basis of its issued share capital as the 
capital maintenance rules had nothing to do with ensuring that a company had adequate capital 
to meet the claims of creditors27.  
 
1.1.2 Legal capital in Malawian company law 
Company law in Malawi traces its origins from English company law. Before 1986, the English 
companies’ statutes of 1908 and 1913 regulated companies in Malawi28. As a result of company 
law reform29, Malawi enacted a new Companies Act in 1984 (‘Companies Act, 1984’) which 
came into force on 1st April, 1986. This Act was basically an adoption of the English Companies 
Act, 1948. Through this adoption of the English Companies Act, 1948 in the Malawian 
Companies Act, 1984 company law in Malawi was essentially constructed on the foundations 
which were put in place by the Victorians in the middle of the last century30. The Companies 
                                                          
21 1897 AC 22 (HL). 
22 FHI Cassim et al Contemporary Company Law 2ed (2012) 33. 
23 Ibid 35.    
24 HS Cilliers et al op cit (n16) 322.  
25 For example, in the UK, section 16 of the Companies Act 1928 first made it a statutory offence for a company to 
give financial assistance for the acquisition of its own shares. In South Africa, the Companies Act, 1973 prohibited 
the payment of interest on share capital (section 79); issuing of shares at a discount (sections 81, 82). 
26 See n16. 
27 FHI Cassim op cit (n19) 285.  
28 M Nzunda ‘New Company Law for Malawi’ (1989) 33 No.1 Journal of African Law 1. 
29  Ibid. 
30 Company Law Review Strategy – A Working Paper (Unreported). Paper was accessed by contacting the 
Department of Private Sector Development – Doing Business Reforms Unit, Ministry of Industry and Trade, 
Malawi (email of contact person: kasinje@gmail.com). 
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Act, 1984 required the memorandum of association of a company limited by shares to state the 
amount of authorized share capital of the company which was divided into par value shares31. It 
also maintained several provisions that entrenched the capital maintenance doctrine. For 
instance, Section 74 of the Companies Act, 1984 restricted dividends payment. These could only 
be made out of profits. Further, the Act prohibited a company from acquiring its own shares in 
Section 73. In its Section 60, the Act prohibited a company from paying a commission, discount 
or other allowance to a person as a consideration for subscription of the company’s shares unless 
as permitted by the Act. Although not directly a rule of capital maintenance, in its Section 72, it 
contained a prohibition against a company providing financial assistance for the acquisition of 
its own shares.  
 
1.1.3 Company law reform and the protection of creditors 
The development of the legal capital concept discussed above meant that inevitably or not, the 
courts and the statutes did combine the capital maintenance rules and the par value concept to 
produce two concerning propositions: (a) the measuring rod for judging the propriety or 
impropriety of distributions to equity holders was the company’s ‘capital’; and (b) ‘capital’, in 
line with the criticism of the concept of par value shares noted earlier, referred not to the assets 
held by the company but to the abstract number that was obtained by multiplying the number of 
shares issued by the par value assigned to each share32. For jurisdictions that eventually followed 
the US approach of introducing no par value shares, similarly capital did not refer to the assets 
held by the company but simply meant stated capital33. In effect creditors whose real interest is 
that distributions should only be made if there are sufficient assets to meet their claims as they 
become due or on winding up, were left exposed as the measuring rod for distributions was 
capital which in essence did not mean assets34.  
Just as it did in 1912 to introduce the concept of no par value shares in its traditional 
company law edifice, the US led the way in reforming the legal capital concept. It all began in 
1975 when the state of California adopted a new General Corporations Law. Manning writing in 
1981 wrote that the draftsmen of the new law in California and the accompanying legislative 
                                                          
31 Table B of the First Schedule to the Act. 
32 Manning and Hanks op cit (n3) 34. 
33 Ibid.   
34 See generally the discussion by Manning and Hanks on Legal Capital – Development of the Key Concept. 
Manning and Hanks op cit (n3) 20 – 43. 
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report concurred with the general thesis that the traditional doctrinal edifice of par and legal 
capital was ineffective35. The California Corporations Code, 1975 provided that a company’s 
articles of incorporation needed to only state the total number of authorized shares and the 
number of shares divided into classes36. This meant that the statute omitted the further provision 
found in all other US state statutes that the articles needed to also state whether the share was par 
or no par37. Further, section 500 of the 1975 California Corporation Code completely reformed 
the proposition highlighted earlier that the measuring rod for judging the propriety or 
impropriety of distributions to shareholders was the availability of the company’s capital38. The 
new statute (its s500) permitted a shareholder distribution: (a) to the extent of the company’s 
retained earnings; or (b) if, after the distribution, ‘assets’ (as statutorily defined) were 125% of 
liabilities (as defined) and if other detailed criteria was met regarding the ratio of current assets 
and current liabilities. 
In the US, state legislatures have plenary powers to create corporations39. In an attempt to 
provide a drafting guide for the states, the Committee on Business Corporations of the American 
Bar Association drafted the Model Business Corporation Act, 1950 (‘Model Act’)40. Influenced 
by the changes that took place in California, in 1980 the financial provisions of the Model Act 
were revamped in their entirety41. To appreciate the nature of changes that occurred, the Report 
of the Committee on Corporate Laws which accompanied the 1980 amendments is useful: 
‘The amendments to the financial provisions of the Model Business Corporation Act (the “Model Act”) 
reflect a complete modernization of all the provisions of the Model Act concerning financial matters, 
including - 
(a) the elimination of the outmoded concepts of stated capital and par value, (b) the definition of 
“distribution” as a broad term governing dividends, share repurchases and similar actions that should be 
governed by the same standard, (c) the reformulation of the statutory standards governing the making of 
distributions.…’42 [Sic] 
                                                          
35 B Manning op cit (n6) 164. 
36 See section 202 of the California Corporations Code, 1975 produced in DF Zickerman et al California 
Corporations Code and Corporate Securities Rules (1990) 23. 
37 B Manning op cit (n6) 164. 
38 See n32. 
39 Cox and Hazen Corporations 2ed (2003) 31. 
40 See R Garrett ‘History, Purpose and Summary of the Model Business Corporation Act’ (1950) Vol 6 Issue 1 
BUS.LAW. 1-7. 
41 Manning and Hanks op cit (n3) 176. 




Consequent to the reforms that commenced in 1980, 1984 saw the appearance of the first 
complete revision of the Model Act, Revised Model Business Corporation Act, 1984 (‘Revised 
Model Act)43. Upon further amendments to it in the 1980’s, the Revised Model Act finally 
incorporated a refined set of integral provisions on shareholder pay in and shareholder pay out 
obligations reflecting modern thought and practice in corporation law, finance and accounting44. 
The said refined set of integral provisions on shareholder pay in and shareholder pay out rules 
included the following provisions: 
(i) Section 6.01 (a) on authorized shares which eliminated the mandatory legal capital 
requirement to specify par or no par value shares45.    
(ii) Section 1.40 (6) which broadly defined a distribution as any asset flow from the 
company’s coffers to shareholders that was not matched by an equivalent asset inflow46. 
(iii) Section 6.40 (c) which provided a test for regulating distributions to shareholders. It 
reads as follows: 
‘No distribution may be made if, after giving it effect - (1) the corporation would not be able to pay its debts 
as they become due in the usual course of business; or (2) the corporation’s total assets would be less than 
the sum of its total liabilities plus (unless the articles of incorporation permit otherwise) the amount that 
would be needed, if the corporation were to be dissolved at the time of the distribution, to satisfy the 
preferential rights upon dissolution of shareholders whose preferential rights are superior to those receiving 
the distribution. …’ 
Section 6.40(c) above demonstrates the incorporation of solvency based standards as a 
strategy for protecting the interests of creditors in a modern company law statute. The first 
restriction in s6.40 (c) (1), whether the corporation would not be able to pay its debts as they 
become due in the usual course of business, is what is referred to as the equity insolvency test47.  
The second restriction in s6.40 (c) (2), whether the corporation’s total assets would be less than 
the sum of its total liabilities is referred to as the balance sheet solvency test48. The equity 
insolvency test has generally been part of US corporation law since the early 1800s and the 
                                                          
43 DM Branson ‘Recent Changes to the Model Business Corporation Act: Death Knells for Main Street Corporation 
Law’ (1993) Vol 72 Art 7 Issue 1 Nebraska Law Review 259 at 260n4. 
44 Manning and Hanks op cit (n3) 177. 
45 S6.01 (a) provides that the articles of incorporation must set forth any classes of shares and series of shares within 
a class, and the number of shares of each class and series, that the corporation is authorized to issue. 
46 See Manning and Hanks op cit (n3) 182. See also S1.40 (6) which defines a distribution as a direct or indirect 
transfer of money or other property (except its own shares) or incurrence of indebtedness by a corporation to or for 
the benefit of its shareholders in respect of any of its shares.  A distribution may be in the form of a declaration or 
payment of a dividend; a purchase, redemption, or other acquisition of shares; a distribution of indebtedness; or 
otherwise. 
47 Ibid 63. 
48 Ibid 182. 
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states incorporated it in their statutes49. However, the incorporation of the twin solvency test 
(combination of equity insolvency and balance sheet solvency test) in the Revised Model Act 
was certainly a new feature. Apart from gaining acceptance in a majority of states in the US, the 
section 6.40 combination of equity insolvency and balance sheet solvency coupled with a 
deletion of mandatory outdated legal capital concepts has also been adopted internationally by 
jurisdictions seeking to modernize their company law provisions with respect to affording better 
protection to creditors when the company effects certain transactions50. The twin solvency test 
depending on jurisdiction is referred to simply as ‘solvency test’ or ‘solvency and liquidity 
test’51. This paper adopts the simple terminology of solvency test to mean the twin solvency test. 
Further, this paper uses the words ‘equity solvency’ or ‘equity insolvency’, ‘balance sheet 
solvency’ or ‘balance sheet insolvency’ to mean the two separate tests.  
By contrast, in the UK traditional legal capital rules still remain. Section 542 of the UK 
Companies Act, 2006 states that every share in a limited company having a share capital must 
have a fixed nominal or par value such that an allotment of a share that does not have a fixed 
nominal value is void. The provisions on distributions and reduction of capital in the Companies 
Act, 2006 reinforce the common law prohibition on return of capital to shareholders52. In terms 
of regulating distributions, UK company law has not adopted a solvency based regime. The 
Companies Act, 2006 defines a distribution as every description of distribution of a company’s 
assets to its shareholders whether in cash or otherwise53. It then incorporates mandatory capital 
maintenance rules such as; a company may only make a distribution out of profits available for 
such purpose54 and a limited company is prohibited from acquiring its own shares whether by 
purchase, subscription or otherwise55.  
                                                          
49 The 1950 Model Act employed equity insolvency test in several provisions (ss 5(a), 40, 41(a), 60). Following the 
Chancery courts in England (equity courts), an 1824 opinion by Justice Story in the American case Wood –v- 
Dummer pronounced the equity insolvency test in American corporation law. 30 F.Cas. 435 (no. 17, 944) 
(C.C.D.Me.1824) 
50 South Africa began its reforms to the traditional legal capital rules in 1999 which eventually led to the adoption of 
the Companies Act, 2008. The said 2008 Companies Act replaced the Companies Act 1973 and essentially it has 
jettisoned all the obsolete legal capital rules and adopted the twin solvency test for assessing the legality of 
distributions and other company transactions. Similarly, New Zealand also jettisoned the obsolete legal capital rules 
and adopted a twin solvency test for assessing the legality of distributions.   
51 South Africa refers to it as the solvency and liquidity test whilst New Zealand refers to it as the solvency test. 
52 Part 23 of the Companies Act, 2006 deals with distributions whilst Part 17 deals with reductions of capital.  
53 Section 829 of the Companies Act, 2006. Reduction of capital is not a distribution. 
54 Section 830 of the Companies Act, 2006. 
55 Section 658 (1) of the Companies Act, 2006. 
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However, policymakers at the European level appear to be edging towards moving away from 
the mandatory legal capital rules and in line with that approach, the possibility of shifting to a 
solvency based pay-out regime for dividends by private companies was considered in the UK in 
the reform exercise that preceded the Companies Act 200656. In fact, in terms of reduction of 
capital by private companies, the Companies Act, 2006 in section 641 adopted a solvency based 
regime by providing that a private company limited by shares may reduce its share capital by 
special resolution supported by a solvency statement57. The willingness to adopt a solvency 
based regime for reductions of capital when it can be argued that in economic terms, dividends, 
reductions of capital and share buy backs have much in common and can be regarded simply as 
alternative methods of returning value to shareholders is quiet odd58. However, looked at from 
the angle of company law reform, it demonstrates how far UK company law has come from the 
mandatory legal capital rules to the point of embracing solvency standards.   
 
1.1.4 The shift to the solvency test in Malawi 
Malawi has also reformed its company law by enacting a new Companies Act 15 of 201359 
(‘Companies Act, 2013’) which has replaced the Companies Act, 1984. The new Companies 
Act, 2013 in complete contrast to the Companies Act, 1984 states that shares created after 
commencement of the Act must not have a nominal value60. It also permits a number of 
transactions that were prohibited outright in the Companies Act 1984 as a result of its capital 
                                                          
56 E Ferran and L Chan Ho op cit (n2) 155-156.    
57 Section 643(1) of the Companies Act, 2006 defines solvency statement: A solvency statement is a statement that 
each of the directors— (a) has formed the opinion, as regards the company’s situation at the date of the statement, 
that there is no ground on which the company could then be found to be unable to pay (or otherwise discharge) its 
debts; and (b) has also formed the opinion— (i) if it is intended to commence the winding up of the company within 
twelve months of that date, that the company will be able to pay (or otherwise discharge) its debts in full within 
twelve months of the commencement of the winding up; or (ii) in any other case, that the company will be able to 
pay (or otherwise discharge) its debts as they fall due during the year immediately following that date. 
(2) In forming those opinions, the directors must take into account all of the company’s liabilities (including any 
contingent or prospective liabilities). 
Similarly, section 714 of the Act continues the theme from the Companies Act 1985 where a private 
company is allowed to make a redemption or purchase of its own shares out of capital as long as the directors make 
a solvency statement.  
58 E Ferran and L. Chan Ho op cit (n2) 159. 
59 Malawi Gazette Supplement of 26th July, 2013. The Act only came into force on 20th May, 2016. 
60 Section 87 of the Malawi Companies Act, 2013. 
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maintenance regime. The new Act permits the previously prohibited transactions subject to 
among other conditions, the company satisfying the solvency test61.  
The requirement to consider and satisfy the solvency test in certain company transactions 
is an entirely new concept in Malawian company law62. The Company Law Review Strategy 
developed by the Ministry of Trade and Industry in Malawi (‘MTI’) which was a working paper 
for the review of the Companies Act, 1984 in the year 2012, did not contain any detailed 
discussion of the policy that led to the adoption of this entirely new concept in Malawian 
company law63. However, the MTI in the introduction to its Company Law Review Strategy did 
give an indication of the thought process that occurred in the revision of company law in 
Malawi: 
‘…The Draft Report on Prioritisation of Economic Laws for Revision (December 2008) recommended that 
Malawi emulates the recent company law reforms in the United Kingdom (UK), South Africa and the 
ongoing company law reforms in Kenya. 
 South Africa has also just completed a review of its companies law. Furthermore, commonwealth 
countries that led the reforms being undertaken in the above mentioned countries would also be useful. These 
are New Zealand in 1993 and Canada in 1985…’64 
In effect, Malawi reformed its company law by emulating the company law reforms that 
occurred in South Africa, Canada, New Zealand and even the UK.  
 
1.2 PROBLEM STATEMENT 
From the discussion so far, two facts become evident. Firstly, the argument for eliminating the 
obsolete legal capital rules and adopting the twin solvency tests in modern company law has 
received backing in many common law jurisdictions. The argument states that the balance sheet 
                                                          
61 To illustrate this point, for example, section 110 of Malawi’s Companies Act, 2013 provides on share 
repurchases by the company and is couched as follows: 
 ‘(1) A company may, subject to – (a) the approval of the Board; and (b) its constitution authorizing it to do so, 
purchase or otherwise acquire its own shares. (2) A company shall not offer or agree to purchase or otherwise 
acquire its own shares unless – (a) the Board is satisfied that – (v) the company shall immediately after the 
acquisition satisfy the solvency test…’ (My emphasis)  
62 It should be noted that this reference to “a new concept in Malawian company law” is in respect of the Companies 
Act and not the financial services laws as are administered by the financial services regulator in Malawi. Companies 
that are licensed or registered as financial institutions have always been required to meet the solvency test per the 
financial services laws. 




solvency element gives advance recognition to the ultimate priority that creditors enjoy over 
shareholders upon dissolution of the company by preventing the company from favouring its 
shareholders through partial liquidation and the equity insolvency element addresses the 
fundamental expectation of creditors to be paid on time65. Secondly, the commonwealth 
countries that have followed the lead of the US in reforming their company law, somehow 
maintain different looking provisions on the definition of the solvency test and the related 
regulation of distributions. Consequently, since the introduction of the modern solvency test 
approach in company law, scholarly reviews on the operation of the solvency test and the 
protection of creditors from unsafe company distribution of assets to shareholders have generally 
proceeded by looking at the unique provisions as enacted in each jurisdiction. Bayless Manning 
certainly led the way in reviewing legal capital reforms in the Model Act and the Revised Model 
Act across the Atlantic66. Closer to Malawi, Kathleen Van der Linde also examined the solvency 
and liquidity approach in the South African Companies Act, 200867. Therefore, as Malawi has 
only had the solvency test in its company law since the 20th of May, 2016 the author suggests a 
valid argument can be made that an examination of the operation of the solvency test as enacted 
in the Malawian Companies Act, 2013 is warranted.  
To elaborate the point being made above, an example can be given of a recent scholarly 
work reviewing the operation of section 6.40 of the Revised Model Act. According to James J. 
Hanks, in its nearly thirty years as part of the Revised Model Act, section 6.40 has worked 
remarkably well68. However there have been questions centering on the interpretation and 
application of the two solvency tests that are the heart of the statute69. In terms of the application 
of the equity insolvency test in the US, a difficulty arises in determining the corporation’s ability 
to pay debts in the usual course of business at some unspecified time ‘in the future’. The further 
in the future is the time when the determination must be made, the more difficult it is for the 
board to make the requisite determinations at the time of its authorization70. However, in the US 
the argument is that directors should find solace from the business judgment rule and as long as 
their determination of equity solvency was based on a rational basis they should not be liable if it 
                                                          
65 K Van Der Linde op cit (n4) 226.  
66 B Manning ‘Legal Capital’. See n6 and n3.  
67 See n4. 
68 JJ Hanks ‘Legal Capital and the Model Business Corporation Act: An Essay for Bayless Manning’ (2011) Law 
and Contemporary Problems 211 - 230. 
69 Ibid. 
70 Ibid.  
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turns out to have been the wrong decision71. For jurisdictions that may have transplanted the US 
legislation into their company law without having the corresponding business judgment rule in 
their statutes the situation would obviously be difficult for directors. 
In 2009, Van der Linde examined the operation of the solvency and liquidity approach 
in the South African Companies Act, 2008. According to Professor Van der Linde the balance 
sheet solvency test in the 2008 Act is out of step with international trends as it is only satisfied 
whenever the assets equal the liabilities following a permitted transaction and no provision is 
made for a solvency margin except in limited circumstances72. She further highlights the 
importance of the question as to what is the proper determination and valuation of assets and 
liabilities to be taken into account when assessing the solvency of a company. The argument is 
that a determination of assets and liabilities based on compliant financial statements is a fairly 
narrow concept and that the application of the solvency and liquidity test involves more than 
looking at statements and records73.  
Additionally, the requirements of when the solvency test must be considered and 
satisfied as well as the manner of application of the test have significant ramifications on the 
protection of creditors74. To illustrate, an example can be given of the provision regulating 
distributions in the South African Companies Act, 200875. Whilst the general principle under the 
South African Act is that a distribution must not be made if the board does not reasonably 
believe the company will satisfy the solvency and liquidity requirements immediately after the 
distribution, the wording of the relevant provision makes it possible for one to interpret it as 
meaning that once the board has by resolution acknowledged that it has applied the test and 
reasonably concluded that the company will satisfy the test immediately after completing the 
proposed transaction, then it will not matter that at the actual point of effecting the transaction 
the company does not satisfy the test76.  
Therefore, the foregoing discussion demonstrates the need to examine the definition of 
the solvency test as enacted in the new Malawian Companies Act, 2013 as well as any other 
matters that may need to be considered in the application of the solvency test as a financial 
                                                          
71 Ibid.  
72 K Van der Linde op cit (n4) 228. 
73 Ibid 231. 
74 Ibid 233 – 239. 
75 Section 46 of the Companies Act, 2008. 
76 K Van Der Linde Op Cit (n4) 239. 
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restriction on distributions and other company transactions in the Act so as to assess whether the 
new solvency test approach in Malawi will afford adequate protection to creditors.  
 
1.2.1 Research Question 
The underlying question this paper seeks to answer is whether the solvency test as enacted in the 
new Malawian Companies Act, 2013 will in its application or operation afford adequate 
protection to the interests of creditors in various company transactions. In order to answer this 
question, the paper will be directed by the following specific questions: 
(i) What are the substantive requirements of the balance sheet and equity solvency tests 
in the new Malawian Companies Act? 
(ii) What guidance does the Act provide on other matters for possible consideration in 
the application of the solvency test such as the determination and valuation of assets and 
liabilities as well as the manner of application of the test?  
 
1.3  RESEARCH OUTLINE 
Chapter one outlines the background to the study, the statement of the problem, justification of 
the study and the research questions directing the study. As can be seen from this chapter, the 
central thesis for this research paper is that modern company law statutes have moved away 
from the traditional concepts of legal capital and have incorporated the solvency test as a more 
adequate restriction when it comes to protecting the interests of creditors during distributions to 
shareholders.  
Against this backdrop, chapter two sets in context the conceptual and theoretical 
framework underpinning the solvency test approach. Because the solvency test is an alternative 
to the traditional legal capital rules, an examination of the critical arguments for and against 
legal capital will be laid out in this chapter.   
Chapter three then looks at the design of the solvency test in the new Malawian Companies 
Act. It examines the elements of the definition of solvency test in the Act and assesses whether 
there is any drawback in the way the solvency test is enacted in the Act. The chapter, which 
follows the approach used by Professor Van der Linde in her discussion of the solvency and 
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liquidity approach in the South African Companies Act, 2008, mainly proceeds by examining 
the interpretational issues of the equity insolvency and balance sheet solvency elements of the 
solvency test as enacted in the Malawian Act.  
Chapter four follows the discussion in the preceding chapter and mainly looks at other 
issues for possible consideration in the definition of the solvency test under the Companies Act, 
2013. Still influenced by the approach of Professor Van der Linde in her discussion of the 
solvency and liquidity approach in South Africa, the chapter discusses the following issues: the 
assets and liabilities that should be included and their valuation; the time when the test should be 
considered and satisfied; and the manner in which the test should be applied.  
The thesis concludes in chapter five by drawing lessons from the preceding chapters and 



















CHAPTER TWO: SOLVENCY BASED REGIME – THEORETICAL ISSUES 
2.0 INTRODUCTION  
Chapter one has described the overall topic of this study: to examine the solvency test approach 
in the new Malawian Companies Act so as to assess whether, in its operation as a financial 
restriction to distributions and other company transactions, it will provide adequate protection to 
creditors. This chapter expounds the theoretical basis for adopting a solvency based regime as a 
modern method for protecting creditors. It begins by examining the theory of creditor protection 
in company law and asks the question do creditors require the protection afforded by the 
solvency test? The discussion then looks at the concept of the solvency test and identifies as well 
as evaluates the issues surrounding both the equity insolvency and the balance sheet solvency 
tests.  
Noting that the new solvency based regime developed out of questioning the value of the 
legal capital doctrine in creditor protection, the discussion generally proceeds by evaluating the 
arguments and counter-arguments put forward by both the critics and defenders of the traditional 
legal capital doctrine.  
 
2.1. CREDITOR PROTECTION IN COMPANY LAW 
The term ‘creditor’ expresses a single basic proposition77. A creditor has, subject to the special 
terms of credit, a higher and prior claim to the assets of his debtor than the debtor has himself78. 
Thus, when a creditor’s claim becomes due and payable, the creditor may, in normal course, 
enlist the engines of the law to compel his debtor to pay the debt, regardless of the consequent 
diminution of the assets that ‘belong’ to the debtor79. According to Manning, a creditor of a 
company seeks four objectives:  
‘(1) The creditor will be happier if the company holds substantial assets at the time he extends credit and 
thereafter; 
(2) The creditor will want to restrict the company from incurring debts to other general creditors with whom 
he might have to share the company’s limited assets; 
                                                          





(3) The creditor will want the company assets to be free and unencumbered of any lien interests of a prior 
(secured) creditor; and 
(4) The creditor will want to preserve a cushion of protective assets, and will want to see to it that no 
shareholder makes off with assets of the company while the creditor’s claim is still outstanding and 
unpaid.’80 [Sic] 
These four objectives provide the essence of creditor protection in company law. As to 
what is meant by ‘creditor protection’ in company law, the literature mainly offers a historical 
explanation. William W Bratton describes creditor protection in US corporate law in this 
manner: 
‘Creditor protection came into corporate law in the United States with the enactment of the first general 
corporation laws in the mid-nineteenth century. These extended limited liability to the shareholders as a 
usual consequence of incorporation, simultaneously imposing creditor protective provisions now known as 
legal capital rules.  
The original legal capital rules mandated minimum capital, requiring that shareholders pay in full for 
stock issued and constraining their receipt of dividends and other distributions of capital. The rules made 
creditor protection as intrinsic an aspect of incorporation as limited liability…’81 [Sic] 
In England, creditor protection in company law perhaps was brought to the fold by Lord 
Jessel M.R. in Flitcrofts’ Case when he stated that ‘a creditor gives credit to a company on the 
faith of the representation of that company that its capital will only be applied for purposes of 
the business and that the creditor therefore has a right to say that the company must keep its 
capital and not return it to the shareholders’ [Sic]82. This statement by Lord Jessel envisages 
protecting creditors from the risk that shareholders would subsequently withdraw their capital 
investment83.  
Therefore, creditor protection rules in company law developed out of the recognition that 
shareholders of companies with debt have strong incentives to act opportunistically at the 
expense of existing creditors84. 
 
                                                          
80 Ibid 11. 
81 WW Bratton ‘Bond Covenants and Creditor Protection: Economics and Law, Theory and Practice, Substance and 
Process’ (2006) 7 Eur. Bus. Org. L. Rev. 39-87. 
82 In Re Exchange Banking Company (Flitcrofts’ Case) supra (n18) 519.  
83 J Armour ‘Share Capital and Creditor Protection: Efficient Rules for a Modern Company Law’ (1999) 63 MLR 
367. (‘J Armour Share Capital and Creditor Protection’). 
84 JR Macey and L Enriques ‘Creditors Versus Capital Formation: The Case Against the European Legal Capital 
Rules’ (2001) Paper 1413 Faculty Scholarship Series: Yale Law School Faculty Scholarship 1168. 
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2.1.1 Creditor Protection and the Case for Solvency-Based Distribution Regulation 
One way shareholders act opportunistically at the expense of creditors is to engage in asset 
diversion by means of company distributions85. To restrict such corporate behaviour and thus 
protect the interests of creditors, company law built a legal apparatus around the concept of legal 
capital86. Legal capital rules have subsequently been jettisoned in common law jurisdictions in 
favour of solvency standards87 and whilst they continue to be in use in Europe, the emerging 
European consensus is that rules that regulate distributions are in need of reform88. However, the 
principle of creditor protection per se does not tell us whether creditors require the protection 
afforded by solvency standards. 
According to Jonathan Rickford the basic interest of creditors, in contexts where assets are 
to be returned to shareholders, is a fair and proportionate protection against threats to 
insolvency89. Company law should focus on the core risk at stake – insolvency90. Although this 
is the basis upon which solvency standards have generally been adopted in most common law 
jurisdictions, to understand the way in which the solvency standards operate, it is helpful, 
analytically, to distinguish between those creditors who are able to change the terms on which 
they lend to reflect the associated risks of default, and those who are not so able—sometimes 
termed ‘adjusting’ and ‘non-adjusting’ creditors respectively91.  
Adjusting creditors are those creditors who voluntarily enter into debt contracts with 
companies and are free to negotiate the terms of the contractual relationship92. They are willing 
to incur the transaction costs such as gathering information, negotiation and the like, necessary 
to adjust the terms upon which credit is extended so as to compensate them appropriately for the 
                                                          
85 Ibid.  
86 WW Bratton op cit (n81). 
87 Manning and Hanks op cit (n3). 
88 See generally, D Kershaw ‘Involuntary Creditors and the Case for Accounting-Based Distribution Regulation’ 
(2007) LSE Law, Society and Economy Working Papers No. 16. Accessed from 
https://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/law/wps/WPS16-2007Kershaw.pdf. Available on 20 December, 2016. 
89 J Rickford ‘REFORMING CAPITAL: Report of the Interdisciplinary Group on Capital Maintenance’ (2004) 
EBLR 971. 
90 Ibid 967. 
91 To formulate the foundational theory upon which this thesis proceeds on, the analysis by J Armour 
provides helpful insight. See, J Armour ‘Legal Capital: An Outdated Concept?’ (2006) Centre for 
Business Research, University of Cambridge Working Paper No. 320 p4. Accessed from 
http://www.cbr.cam.ac.uk/fileadmin/user_upload/centre-for-business-research/downloads/working-




risk they are bearing93. Economic theorists argue that these creditors can self-protect against the 
risk of non-payment by the company94. This can be done in a number of ways including through 
the terms of the contracts that they negotiate95.  They argue further that the ability to self-protect 
indicates that rules developed by the common law or statute aimed at protecting creditors, are 
unnecessary96. On this argument alone, one may be tempted to state that adjusting creditors do 
not require the protection of the statutory solvency standards (my emphasis). However, the only 
world where creditors need no protection from the common law or statute is a fictional world of 
perfect capital markets, in which parties have perfect information and financial contracting is 
costless97. Helen Anderson explains this notion in this manner: 
‘…the self‐protection argument is based on the “efficient markets” hypothesis. This holds that 
“all relevant information will be available to the market and that the market will rapidly, if not instantaneous, 
digest all information as it becomes available”. 
But even the proponents of this theoretical outlook are prepared to admit that markets do not always 
work efficiently, because it does not take into account situations where there is not full information about the 
investment or the borrowing company’s financial position’98 [Sic] 
If markets are imperfect and are characterized by information asymmetries such that it can 
now be argued that statutory rules are needed to protect adjusting creditors, what makes the legal 
capital rules inefficient so as to be jettisoned in favour of solvency standards? 
 One argument in favour of employing legal capital rules as a means of protecting 
adjusting creditors relates to the capital maintenance rule as a conditional restriction for 
distributions. For Professor Armour, the capital maintenance rule can be understood as a means 
of reducing the costs of post-contractual opportunism by shareholders99. According to this 
understanding, at the time of contracting, adjusting creditors incorporate the legal capital of the 
company into their assessment of the risk of default by the company100. If, following the 
consummation of the contract, the company is able to return legal capital or an amount 
representing legal capital in the accounts to the shareholders then the terms of the agreement are 
                                                          
93 Ibid. 
94 H Anderson ‘Directors’ Liability to Creditors – What are the Alternatives?’ (2006) 18.2 BLR 3.  
95 Ibid. 
96 Ibid 4. 
97 J Armour Share Capital and Creditor Protection op cit (n83) 357.  
98 H Anderson op cit (n94) 4. 
99 J Armour Share Capital and Creditor Protection op cit (n83) 367. 
100 D Kershaw op cit (n88) 5. 
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unilaterally altered by the company to the detriment of the adjusting creditor101. The capital 
maintenance doctrine is therefore a conditional financial restriction whereby, provided the 
company is able to meet a certain minimum financial condition (e.g. the availability of profits – 
‘net profits test’), shareholders are free to participate in company distributions102. 
 Consequently, rather than having each adjusting creditor contract separately with the 
company for a restriction on distributions, the capital maintenance statutory framework can be 
understood as writing a collective ‘creditor term’ into the corporate constitution103. In this vein, 
those who argue for legal capital rules state that statutory capital maintenance rules reduce the 
costs for contracting for adjusting creditors as they are provided with ‘default contract terms’.   
The counter-argument to the theory that statutory legal capital rules might assist adjusting 
creditors in reducing their costs of contractual specification is that the statutory legal capital 
rules should generally be defaults, ie only applicable unless parties specify otherwise – rather 
than mandatory, so that parties to whom they are not suited do not find themselves saddled with 
inferior terms104. To this extent, Armour notes that if one considers the mandatory capital 
maintenance doctrine, several commentators argue that the relevant statutory provisions are 
unlikely to be terms which any creditor would choose for themselves105. This is because share 
capital is based on historic valuations ascribed to assets transferred to the company and as time 
goes on the utility of capital as a minimum financial condition for distributions will diminish, as 
the value of the company’s assets bears less and less resemblance to the amount of the 
shareholders’ capital claims106. 
The conclusion drawn out of the foregoing economic theory against mandatory legal 
capital rules is that whilst legal capital rules were rationalized as an attempt to protect corporate 
creditors from expropriation by shareholders, and whilst in theory, rules which prevent such 
wealth transfers (eg capital maintenance rules) can enhance efficiency (by reducing the costs of 
contracting for adjusting creditors), the mandatory legal capital rules impose restrictions on 
                                                          
101 Ibid. 
102 J Armour Share Capital and Creditor Protection op cit (n83) 367 - 368. 
103 Ibid 368. 
104 See, I Ayres and R Gertner ‘Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules’ 
(1989) 99 Yale LJ 87 at 87–89 cited in J. Armour Share Capital and Creditor Protection op cit (n83) 362. 
105 J Armour Share Capital and Creditor Protection op cit (n83) 373. 
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companies which are ill-tuned to the needs of contracting parties107. On the whole, the costs of 
such restrictions are likely to outweigh any benefits they bring108.  
As for non-adjusting creditors (creditors who do not contract with companies), a restriction 
on the return of capital to shareholders is by itself of little assistance109. It cannot be said that 
non-adjusting creditors rely on the capital maintenance regime. Non–adjusting creditors such as 
employees, tort claimants, tax regulators etc cannot be said to be the creditors that were 
envisaged by Lord Jessel M.R. in Flitcrofts case. Rickford states that by definition involuntary 
or non-adjusting creditors do not rely on the levels of capital maintained by the companies 
concerned110. 
In view of the literature questioning the value of the legal capital doctrine, the case for 
solvency based distribution regulation is made. Armour after utilizing economic analysis to 
examine the capital maintenance regime, suggests that ‘instead, tests which restrict shareholder 
asset transfers on the basis of gearing (ratio of debt to equity) or liquidity (ability to realize cash 
for assets) would be more appropriate111. Ferran also notes the case for solvency standards in 
regulating distributions112. She begins by highlighting the legal capital doctrine expounded in 
Article 17(1) of the EC Second Company Law Directive which reads as follows: 
‘Except for cases of reductions of subscribed capital, no distribution to shareholders may be made when on 
the closing date of the last financial year the net assets as set out in the company’s annual accounts are, or 
following a distribution would become, lower than the amount of the subscribed capital plus those reserves 
which may not be distributed under the law or the statutes.’ [Sic] 
She states that the effect of this provision is that only that portion of the net assets that 
exceeds the capital and undistributable reserves can be paid out to shareholders, notwithstanding 
that from a solvency perspective, which tests the ability to pay debts as they fall due and/or by 
reference to the overall net asset position (total assets less total liabilities, not treating share 
capital as a liability), the company might well have capacity to make larger pay-outs without 
threatening creditors’ expectations of repayment (my emphasis)113. In this regard, solvency 
based distribution regulation would afford better protection to both adjusting and non-adjusting 
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creditors. This is certainly the case as economic theory demonstrates that rigid legal capital rules 
that seek to protect creditors ex ante are inefficient114. Flexible ex post solvency standards are 
inherently preferable115. 
 
2.2 THE CONCEPT OF THE SOLVENCY TEST 
The foregoing discussion elucidates the fact that the development of the solvency test as a 
minimum financial condition for distributions is a result of reforms to the legal capital doctrine. 
As highlighted in the previous chapter, company law reforms that have come to the field of legal 
capital began in 1975 when the state of California in the USA amended its General Corporation 
Law116. Prior to the amendment, the law in California permitted corporations to pay dividends 
only  from the corporation’s ‘earned surplus,’ which was an antiquated legal accounting concept 
based on the idea that shares had a ‘par value’ representing the amount of capital contributed to 
the corporation117. The amended California Corporations Code which was adopted in 1977 
discarded long out-modelled legal capital concepts and adopted GAAP as a step towards 
improving the law’s regulation of dividend distributions118. However, the solvency test approach 
adopted in many common law jurisdictions today bears much similarity to the one enacted in the 
Revised Model Act119. Cox and Hazen make the following comments on the Model Act: 
‘The current version of the Model Act follows California’s lead in jettisoning most of the traditional legal 
capital concepts … It also retains the equity insolvency test as a basic restriction. The Model Act diverges 
significantly from California in rejecting a restriction based on earnings.  
In lieu of retained earnings or earned surplus, the Model Act uses a simpler and more flexible 
balance-sheet test. The new provision prohibits distributions if, after the distribution, a corporation’s total 
assets are less than its total liabilities plus liquidation preferences, if any. The Model Act further declines 
dependency on GAAP by placing the method for valuation of assets and liabilities within the directors’ 
discretion, subject to a standard of reasonableness under the circumstances.’120 [Sic] 
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The equity insolvency and the balance sheet solvency tests form the basis of the solvency test 
regime under investigation in this thesis. 
 
2.2.1 Function and operation of the solvency test 
Professors Pellens and Sellhorn state that a solvency test’s primary function is to prevent 
distributions by companies that are already insolvent, as well as distributions that are likely to 
result in the company becoming insolvent121. The solvency test protects creditors by ascertaining 
that distributions to shareholders are only made when the corporation documents before a 
proposed distribution that payments due to creditors are not jeopardized122. Solvency-based 
standards operate by requiring the directors of a company to take a view on the company’s 
solvency and to assume personal liability for that view123. Thus, solvency tests can be drafted in 
different ways but typically would require directors to certify that the company is solvent at the 
time of the pay-out and for some time thereafter124.  
In terms of the equity insolvency test, Manning states that this test was developed by the 
English Chancery Courts – equity courts125. In the equity courts, the test of a debtor’s insolvency 
was whether he was unable to meet his obligations as they became due126. The significance of 
the equity insolvency test is that it is a restraint on distributions to shareholders within the 
context of the on-going corporation127. As to its meaning, Professor Jooste, noting that in 
Australia the test for insolvency of a company has for a long time been whether the company is 
unable to pay its debts as they become due and payable, utilises what the Australian courts have 
held in that regard to determine the meaning of equity insolvency test. He states as follows: 
‘The Australian Courts have held that whether a company is unable to pay its debts as they fall due is always 
a question of fact to be decided as a matter of commercial reality in the light of all the circumstances of the 
case, and not merely by looking at the accounts and making a mechanical comparison of assets and 
liabilities. 
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The position must be viewed as it would be by someone operating in a practical business 
environment. This requires a consideration of the company’s financial condition in its entirety, including the 
nature and circumstances of its activities, its assets and liabilities and their nature, cash on hand, moneys 
procurable within a relatively short time by the sale of assets, by way of a loan and mortgage or pledge of 
assets, or by raising capital.  
The size of any deficiency between assets and liabilities of the company is a factor that can be taken 
into account, for it may be indicative of a company that, on relevant dates, could not reasonably be expected 
to be able to pay its debts as and when they become due.’128 [Sic] 
Despite this elaborate expression of the meaning of equity insolvency test, equity 
insolvency has been said to be an elusive concept. In 1981, Daniel Murphy in his analysis of the 
revisions to the financial provisions of the Model Act said that ‘one consequence of the recent 
and far-reaching revisions to the financial provisions of the Model Act is to re-focus attention on 
the significance of the elusive concept of equity insolvency as it affects corporate distributions’129 
(my emphasis). Recently, Hanks has analysed the application and interpretation of the current 
equity insolvency test in section 6.40(c) (1) of the Revised Model Act. He states that there is 
ordinarily little difficulty in determining whether a corporation, even one in financial difficulty, 
is currently able to pay its debts in ‘the usual course of business’130. The difficulties arise in 
determining the corporation’s ability to pay its debts in the usual course at some unspecified 
time in the future131. The further in the future is the time when the determination must be made, 
the more difficult it is for the board to make the requisite determination at the time of its 
authorization132.  
The official comment to section 6.40 notes as follows on the determinations that must be 
made by the board with regards to the equity insolvency test:  
‘In determining whether the equity insolvency test has been met, certain judgments or assumptions as to the 
future course of the corporation’s business are customarily justified, absent clear evidence to the contrary.  
These include the likelihood that (a) based on existing and contemplated demand for the corporation’s 
products or services, it will be able to generate funds over a period of time sufficient to satisfy its existing 
and reasonably anticipated obligations as they mature, and (b) indebtedness which matures in the near-term 
will be refinanced where, on the basis of the corporation’s financial condition and future prospects and the 
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general availability of credit to businesses similarly situated, it is reasonable to assume that such refinancing 
may be accomplished…” 133 [Sic] 
Noting the above comment, Manning asks the following questions: Can a board of 
directors with any confidence make such futuristic analyses and judgments? Over how many 
months, years or decades ahead are they called upon to do so134? Pellens and Sellhorn perhaps 
provide the answer to these questions as they state that neither the Model Act itself nor the 
explanatory literature contains concrete guidance on how to conduct equity insolvency tests135.  
The foregoing discussion on the Model Act’s equity insolvency test paints the picture of 
the issue that surrounds the operation of the equity insolvency test and its ability to provide 
adequate protection for creditors. According to Ferran, since it is not feasible to expect directors 
to assume personal liability for the performance of the company long into the future (when they 
may no longer be in charge of directing its affairs), a limited time horizon, such as twelve 
months, is appropriate for the equity insolvency test136. She however goes on to state that the 
discussion in the literature on how best to factor long term liabilities into the assessment of 
equity insolvency is a complex and controversial issue137. Van der Linde also notes the same 
issue in her analysis of the solvency and liquidity approach in the South African Companies Act, 
2008138. Section 4(1) (b) of the 2008 Act states that the liquidity element will be satisfied if, 
considering all reasonably foreseeable financial circumstances of the company at the time, it 
appears that the company will be able to pay its debts as they become due in the course of 
business for a period of twelve months139. Van der Linde submits that the imposition of a time 
limit is undesirable and that the ‘ordinary course of business’ of each company should be the 
decisive factor in judging its liquidity140. This is because, whilst the specification of a time 
period will provide more certainty for directors when they authorize a distribution, it may 
disadvantage creditors of companies that have clearly foreseeable longer-term commitments that 
are not payable within twelve months141. In the UK, concerns about longer term solvency issues 
were an inhibiting factor when the possibility of shifting to a solvency based pay-out regime for 
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dividends by private companies was considered in the reform exercise that preceded the 
Companies Act, 2006142. The worry was that the proposed equity solvency test which would 
only require the directors to consider debts falling due in the next year, thus allowing the 
company to pay a dividend even though it had long term liabilities exceeding its assets, provided 
only an assurance of short-term solvency and this was not a sufficient guarantee of the 
company’s ability to meet its long term debts, and therefore did not provide adequate protection 
for creditors143.   
In view of the foregoing, Ferran states that where a specification of a time period for 
assessing equity insolvency is in place, one approach would be to require directors simply to 
take account of long term liabilities in determining their company’s solvency thereby leaving 
considerable discretion with the directors as to the weight to be attached to long-term 
liabilities144. This ordinarily would mean the relevant Companies Act accepts by way of 
codification of the business judgment rule, that these are matters of judgment for the directors145. 
She further states that another approach would be to require directors to determine solvency 
specifically by reference to an accounts-based balance sheet test of an excess of assets over 
liabilities146. 
The balance sheet test was developed as a concept of insolvency for use in bankruptcy 
proceedings in the English common law courts147. The test for bankruptcy was whether the 
aggregate amount of the debtor’s assets was less than the total amount of his liabilities148. Thus 
balance sheet tests start by comparing the company’s assets shown on its balance sheet with the 
liabilities shown there149. Cox and Hazen state that in accounting, the balance sheet sets forth a 
company’s cumulative financial position as of a specific date150. The balance sheet reports on the 
composition of the company’s assets, liabilities, and owners’ equity at a fixed point in time151. 
This elaboration of a balance sheet means that an accounts-based balance sheet test is static; it 
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speaks of a particular point in time152. In this regard, a balance sheet solvency test can be 
differentiated from an equity insolvency test whose assessment is inherently forward looking153.  
The literature in the US, itself being a leading jurisdiction on the reforms to legal capital, 
categorizes balance sheet tests into two groups. These are balance sheet tests that employ stated 
capital and those tests not employing stated capital154. For balance sheet tests that employ stated 
capital these are mainly sub-categorized into stated capital/surplus test and stated capital/earned 
surplus test155. Manning states that the central idea of the stated capital/surplus test is that a 
distribution is forbidden if after giving effect to it the total of assets would be less than the sum 
of liabilities plus stated capital; or (put affirmatively) a distribution is permitted to the extent 
there is a ‘surplus’, with ‘surplus’ defined as the amount by which assets are greater than the 
sum of liabilities plus stated capital156. The stated capital/earned surplus test works just as the 
stated capital/surplus test except that the earned surplus test looks to realized gains and 
accumulated but undistributed profits as the normal basis of distributions157. Thus earned surplus 
is a far more stringent limitation on distributions than mere surplus test because it links such 
distributions directly to the financial performance of the company158.  
On the other hand, balance sheet tests that do not employ stated capital are sub-categorized 
into net worth and adjusted net worth tests159. Net worth balance sheet test prohibits distributions 
if after giving effect to it, a company’s assets as shown on the balance sheet would be less than 
its liabilities160. Adjusted net worth balance sheet test works in the same manner as the net worth 
test except that it adjusts the standard net worth calculation by including or excluding certain 
assets or liabilities in a manner different from that employed by GAAP to arrive at net worth161.  
Jurisdictions that have followed the US’ lead in adopting twin solvency tests, mainly adopt 
the net worth test162 or the adjusted net worth test as their balance sheet test163. The Official 
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Comment to section 6.40 of the Revised Model Act highlights the inadequacy of balance sheet 
tests that utilize ‘stated capital ’, ‘capital surplus’ and ‘earned surplus’ (as well as other types of 
surplus). It states that the net effect of most statutes in the US that employed stated capital and 
the surplus tests was to permit the distribution to shareholders of most or all of the corporation’s 
net assets (its capital along with its earnings) if the shareholders wished this to be done164. 
 However, any form of balance sheet test - be it capital surplus test, earned surplus test, net 
worth test or adjusted net worth test - by its very nature is inherently dependent upon the 
accounting principles followed in constructing the numbers on both the assets and the liabilities 
sides of the balance sheet165. Manning states that the interplay of law and accounting that 
determine these numbers is exceedingly complex, subtle and difficult166. In the same vein, 
Ferran states that a reference to an accounts based balance sheet test of an excess of assets over 
liabilities leads to the problem that financial statements drawn up under accounting rules that 
were not designed with creditors’ interests primarily in mind are not necessarily a reliable 
yardstick167. Consequently, a fundamental question posed in the assessment of the modern twin 
solvency tests is whether there is a case for adopting the additional balance sheet test or indeed 
the equity insolvency test on its own is adequate? 
Hanks argues that it is not necessary to have both solvency tests and that the equity 
insolvency test is all that is needed168. Hanks’ view is perhaps given force by an economic 
argument which states as follows: 
‘There is no difference between an assessment of the net asset position of a company (balance sheet test) and 
an assessment of solvency (equity insolvency), once the accounting figures are subjected to proper business 
appraisal.  
This is because the value of an asset is the discounted value of the cash which the asset is expected to 
realize and the value of a liability is the discounted value of the prospect of having to lay out cash to satisfy 
it. If so, the addition of a net assets test adds nothing, particularly if there is a requirement to take account of 
the accounting information in reaching the conclusion on solvency…’169 [Sic] 
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Rickford argues that the main advantage for adopting the additional simple balance sheet test as 
was adopted under the Revised Model Act is that it provides a further discipline which will in 
practice assist company directors in considering the basis on which they may legitimately decide 
to make a distribution170. However he goes on to state that because of the linkage to historical 
balance sheet information, the test is inflexible and not properly linked to solvency171. 
Despite the argument against the adoption of a balance sheet test in addition to the equity 
insolvency test, it ought to be borne in mind that balance sheet and equity insolvency tests have 
different theoretical justifications. Van der Linde states that balance sheet test gives advance 
recognition to the ultimate priority that creditors enjoy over shareholders upon dissolution of the 
company by preventing the company from favouring its shareholders through a partial 
liquidation and the justification for equity insolvency test is that it addresses the fundamental 
expectation of creditors to be paid on time and also fits in well with the representation a 
company is said to make when it incurs debt, namely that it reasonably expects to be able to pay 
as and when the debt becomes due172. This is the thesis upon which jurisdictions have followed 
the US’ lead in adopting the twin solvency tests. 
 
2.3 CONCLUSION 
Shareholders of companies with debt have strong incentives to act to the detriment of creditors 
by, among other ways, asset diversion through distributions. Traditionally, the legal capital 
doctrine has been the legal apparatus for regulating distributions. However, modern company 
law has jettisoned the legal capital doctrine and adopted the solvency test as a financial 
restriction on distributions. 
Having seen the adoption of the solvency test as a financial restriction on distributions, it is 
important to examine whether creditors require the protection afforded by the solvency test. One 
way to do this is to distinguish between adjusting creditors and non-adjusting creditors and how 
they relate to the traditional legal capital doctrine. 
Arguments borne out of economic theory conclude that legal capital rules are inefficient 
and the costs they impose on adjusting creditors outweighs their benefits. As for non-adjusting 
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creditors, legal capital rules simply do not afford them any assistance. Further, flexible solvency 
standards are deemed to be better alternatives to the legal capital rules. In this regard, whilst the 
theory of creditor protection per se may not explain why creditors require the protection afforded 
by the solvency test, the criticism levelled against legal capital rules in a sense makes out the 
case for the solvency test.  
Modern company law statutes that follow the US’ Model Act enact the twin solvency test 
(equity solvency test and balance sheet solvency test). The equity solvency test looks at whether 
a company is able to pay its debts as they become due in the normal course of business. It is 
forward looking and generally involves a question of fact. Generally, the equity solvency test 
does not present a lot of issues for discussion although there is an issue in the literature relating 
to how best to factor long term liabilities into the assessment of equity insolvency. 
The balance sheet solvency test on the other hand reports on a company’s financial 
position at a particular point in time. Any form of balance sheet test utilizes accounting 
principles to determine the assets and liabilities on a company’s balance sheet. The dependence 
on accounting principles by the balance sheet test is its main criticism. Consequently, it has been 
argued that the equity insolvency test is all that is needed and that the further adoption of the 
balance sheet test is a redundancy.  
Whilst the arguments against the adoption of the balance sheet solvency test as an 
additional obligation in assessing company distributions have some force, the case for the twin 
solvency tests is made on the foundation that equity insolvency and balance sheet solvency tests 










CHAPTER THREE: THE SOLVENCY TEST UNDER THE NEW MALAWIAN 
COMPANIES ACT, 2013. 
 
3.0 INTRODUCTION  
This chapter analyses the interpretation and application of the solvency test as defined in the new 
Malawian Companies Act, 2013. The chapter (as well as the next chapter) is primarily modelled 
on the review of the solvency and liquidity approach in the South African Companies Act, 2008 
by Professor Van der Linde173. Whilst, in her analysis of the solvency test under the 2008 Act, 
Van der Linde looks at the two separate elements of the solvency test (equity solvency test and 
balance sheet solvency test) as well as the following other matters:  the assets and liabilities that 
should be included and their valuation; the circumstances where a qualification applies in favour 
of preferential shareholders; the time when the test should be considered and satisfied; and the 
manner in which the test should be applied, this chapter only considers the two separate elements 
of the test. The other matters for possible consideration are examined in chapter four. 
The argument in this chapter is that whilst the solvency test which has been enacted in the 
new Malawian Companies Act represents welcome reforms to the inefficient regime of 
regulating distributions via the traditional English capital maintenance rule as was the case under 
the old Malawian Companies Act, 1984174, the design or drafting of the said test is out of step 
with international trends. In its current state, the test will not afford adequate protection to 
creditors against opportunistic shareholder behaviour. 
 
3.1 INTERPRETATION OF THE SOLVENCY TEST UNDER THE COMPANIES ACT, 
2013 
Section 2(5) of the Companies Act, 2013 provides as follows: 
‘For the purposes of this Act – “solvency test” means – 
(a) the company is able to pay its debts as they become due in the normal course of business; and 
(b) the value of the company’s assets is greater than the sum of – 
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(i) the value of its liabilities; and 
(ii) the company’s stated capital. 
(c) other than in relation to compromises, reconstructions and takeovers in determining whether the value of a 
company’s assets is greater than the value of its liabilities, the board may take into account – 
(i) in the case of a public company or a private company, the most recent financial statements of the 
company prepared in accordance with IFRS; and 
(ii) a valuation of assets and estimates of liabilities that are reasonable in the circumstances. 
(d) for the purposes of determining whether the value of the compromise, reconstruction or take-over 
company’s assets is greater than the value of its liabilities and its stated capital, the directors of each 
compromise, reconstruction or take over company – 
(i) shall have regard to – 
(aa) financial statements that are prepared in accordance with IFRS and that are prepared as if the 
compromise, reconstruction or take over had become effective; and 
(bb) all other circumstances that the directors know or ought to know would affect, or may affect, the 
value of the compromise, reconstruction or take over company’s assets and the value of its liabilities;  
(ii) may rely on valuations of assets or estimates of liabilities that are reasonable in the circumstances.’ 
At the outset, an assumption can be made that the introductory sentence to the above 
quoted section 2(5) as well as its paragraphs (a) and (b) intended to provide that for the purposes 
of this Act - a company satisfies the solvency test if: (a) the company is able to pay its debts as 
they become due in the normal course of business; and (b) the value of the company’s assets is 
greater than the sum of the value of its liabilities and the company’s stated capital (my 
emphasis). This would seem to be a more appropriate reading of the provision and the remaining 
paragraphs in the provision qualify this meaning of solvency test.  
In section 2(5) (a) and (b) above, the Companies Act, 2013 has enacted the equity 
insolvency test (whether a company is able to pay its debts as they become due in the normal 
course of business) and the balance sheet solvency test (whether the value of the company’s 
assets is greater than the sum of the value of its liabilities and stated capital)175. For distributions 
to be legal under the new Act, both the equity insolvency test and the balance sheet test must be 
met176. Notably, under the Malawian Act the twin solvency tests are only referred to as the 
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solvency test177. Further, the solvency test is not only a prerequisite for all distributions, but must 
also be satisfied when effecting other transactions that may prejudice creditors178. This is in line 
with international trends179. 
 
3.1.1 The equity insolvency element 
Equity insolvency test is generally referred to as the liquidity test in other jurisdictions180. There 
are two main approaches to liquidity or the ability to service debt181. Van der Linde explains 
these two main approaches as follows: 
‘The first entails a balance sheet test based on current assets and current liabilities, while the second involves 
a cash flow analysis. A reference to debts “as they become due” or “as they become payable in the ordinary 
course of business” indicates that a cash flow prediction should be used.  
This takes into account not only current assets but also future income of and credit given to the 
company. On the liabilities side not only existing current liabilities but also prospective liabilities are 
included... The cash flow prediction approach is more commonly used, and is also followed in the … 
Companies Act 2008.’182 [Sic] 
The Malawian Act defines the equity solvency element to mean that a company is able to 
pay its debts ‘as they become due in the normal course of business’. The phrase ‘in the normal 
course of business’ has the same meaning as the South African Companies Act phrase ‘in the 
ordinary course of business’ or the American Revised Model Act phrase ‘in the usual course of 
business’183. In effect, a similar cash flow prediction approach should be used in Malawi. 
The equity insolvency limitation adopted in the Companies Act, 2013 is not new in 
Malawi. Under the old Companies Act, 1984 it formed an integral part of the law relating to 
liquidation of companies184. Section 213 (1) (d) of the 1984 Act provided that a court may order 
the winding up of a company if the company was unable to pay its debts. A company was 
deemed to be unable to pay its debts if a creditor to whom the company was indebted in a sum 
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exceeding K100 then due had served on the company a written demand under his hand requiring 
the company to pay the sum so due, and the company had for 21 days thereafter neglected to pay 
the sum or to secure or compound it to the reasonable satisfaction of the creditor185. Further, a 
company was also deemed to be unable to pay its debts if it was proved to the satisfaction of the 
court that the company simply was unable to pay its debts186.  
What the Malawian courts have held with regard to company insolvency under the 
Companies Act, 1984 would therefore be useful in determining the meaning of equity insolvency 
under the new Companies Act, 2013. Unfortunately, there is exasperatingly little discussion in 
the cases of an approach or methodology to be employed in making this determination of 
insolvency187.   
However, as noted in the previous chapter, Professor Jooste has highlighted what the 
Australian courts have held in relation to the meaning of equity insolvency. Whether a company 
is unable to pay its debts as they fall due is always a question of fact to be decided as a matter of 
commercial reality in the light of all the circumstances of the case, and not merely by looking at 
the accounts and making a mechanical comparison of assets and liabilities188. A similar 
determination can be found in an American case, Hoagland v. United States Trust Co189 where a 
prominent construction company with assets significantly in excess of liabilities, was in a 
typically tight cash position but was able to meet all of its obligations until the filing of the 
petition in bankruptcy190. The court after meticulously reciting the financial chronology of the 
company during the relevant months, concluded based on the factual evidence of the company's 
relationships with its lenders and the value of its collateral that the company was solvent when 
the payments in question - repayment of certain loan obligations were made191. Therefore the 
court examined the financial condition of the company in great detail and reached the conclusion 
that the company was solvent based on a factual assessment of the company's viability at the 
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time of the transfers192. In a sense therefore, the methodology to be employed in determining the 
equity insolvency test under the Malawian Companies Act, 2013 should involve a factual 
assessment of the financial condition of the company taking into account all the circumstances of 
the case.   
As highlighted in the preceding chapter, there is ordinarily little difficulty in determining 
whether a company, even one in financial difficulty is currently able to pay its debts as they 
become due in the normal course of business193. The difficulty arises when directors have to 
consider how best to factor long term liabilities in the equity insolvency test194. Consequently, 
one of the approaches taken in the statutes has been to prescribe a specific time period such as 12 
months for the determination of equity solvency195. This approach has been criticized on the 
basis that whilst the specification of a time period will provide more certainty for directors when 
they authorize a distribution, it may disadvantage creditors of companies that have clearly 
foreseeable longer-term commitments that are not payable within twelve months196.  
The submission is that the imposition of a time limit is undesirable and that the ‘ordinary 
course of business’ of each company should be the decisive factor in judging its liquidity197. This 
is certainly the case under the new Malawian Companies Act, 2013 which does not impose a 
time limit and merely uses ‘normal course of business’ as the decisive factor. The Companies 
Act, 2013, on this aspect, is therefore in line with good international practice198. 
 
3.1.2 The balance sheet solvency element 
Under section 2 (5) of the Companies Act, 2013 a company will satisfy the balance sheet 
solvency element if the value of its assets is greater than the sum of the value of its liabilities and 
its stated capital. This definition of the balance sheet solvency test means that Malawi is a stated 
capital/surplus jurisdiction199.  
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The central idea of stated capital/surplus balance sheet solvency tests is that a distribution is 
forbidden if after giving effect to it, the company’s assets would be less than the sum of its 
liabilities plus stated capital or (put affirmatively) a distribution is permitted to the extent there is 
a ‘surplus’, with ‘surplus’ defined as the amount by which assets are greater than the sum of 
liabilities plus stated capital200. Practically, if the figures on the assets side of a company’s 
balance sheet actually reflect their sell-off value, and if all the assets are sold for cash, and if all 
the creditors are paid off, and if the money that is left over for the shareholders is less than the 
‘capital’ they put into the company in the first place, the stated capital/surplus statutory scheme 
forbids the ongoing company from distributing assets to shareholders201. Manning presents a 
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‘Balance Sheet of Laminated Thumbscrew, Inc., Immediately Following Organization and Funding 
 
              ASSETS                                                      LIABILITIES 
Cash                           $50,000                                                                    -0- 
                                                              SHAREHOLDERS’ EQUITY 
                                                              Capital: 500 ordinary shares         $50, 000 
                                                              Surplus                                          -0- 
                                   $50,000                                                                     $50, 000 
 
In the circumstances of this balance sheet, there is no “surplus” and a distribution of any assets to 
shareholders would be ‘illegal’. 
 
Balance Sheet of Laminated Thumbscrew, Inc., Year End After Two Years of Operations 
 
              ASSETS                                                        LIABILITIES 
 
Cash                             $16, 000                  Accounts payable                            $3, 000 
Accounts receivable         8,000                        Liabilities                                   $3, 000 
Securities                       54, 000                         SHAREHOLDERS’ EQUITY 
Inventory                       15, 000                         Capital: 500 ordinary shares     50, 000 
Land                                5, 000                         Surplus                                       46, 001             
Patents                             1, 001                         Shareholders’ equity                  96, 001 
                                     $99, 001                                                                          $99, 001 
 
As a result of the second year’s operations, according to this accounting record, the company has acquired 
additional assets, has paid off the bank debt, overcome the deficit it had at the end of the preceding year and 
generated a balance sheet surplus of $46, 001 above its ‘capital’ and debt. The company may now legally distribute 
to shareholders assets having a ‘book value’ of $46, 001 or less.’202 [Sic] 
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In company law, ‘capital’ refers to proceeds from the sale of shares and represents money or 
other consideration that shareholders pay for an interest in the company or a right to participate 
in profits and growth through dividends and other distributions of company assets203. In effect, a 
company’s capital is the company’s issued capital204.  
The significance of this definition of ‘capital’ becomes apparent when one considers the 
definition of stated capital included in the Malawian Companies Act, 2013. Stated capital is 
defined in the Act as follows: 
‘(a) … in relation to a class or classes of shares issued by a company including such no par value or nominal 
shares as may have been issued by the company before the commencement of this Act, means the total of all 
amounts received by the company or due and payable to the company in respect of –  
(i) the issue of the shares; and  
(ii) calls on the shares; 
(b) … in relation to a class or classes of shares issued by a company including such par value or nominal 
shares as may have been issued by the company before the commencement of this Act, means the total value 
of all amounts received by the company or due and payable to the company in respect of – 
(i) the nominal paid-up value of the shares where applicable; and 
(ii) the share premiums paid to the company in relation to those shares and required to be transferred to the 
share premium account ….’ [Sic] 
The above definition of stated capital which incorporates the total amounts received by the 
company in respect of par value shares (albeit par value shares issued before the commencement 
of the Act) as well as the consideration received for shares without par value is not unusual in 
company law205. From the above definition, stated capital under the Companies Act, 2013 is a 
corresponding analogue to the issued capital of a company. Interestingly, the issued capital of a 
company bears no necessary relationship to the market value of the shares of the company: the 
market value of shares in a company may exceed or be less than the issue price for those 
shares206. The issued capital of a particular share is the amount that was paid to the company at 
the time of its issue207 and the value of shares will constantly fluctuate208. Therefore usage of 
                                                          
203 V Krishna ‘Equity Financing: Corporate Aspects’ (2008) 19.3 Canadian Current Tax. See also Cox and Hazen op 
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204 KP McGuinness The Law and Practice of Canadian Business Corporations 6ed (1999) 299. 
205 See R Garrett ‘Capital and Surplus under the New Corporation Statutes’ (1958) Vol 23 Issue 2 Law and 
Contemporary Problems 245 - 246. 




stated capital in the balance sheet solvency element of the definition of solvency test under the 
Companies Act, 2013 seems odd considering that stated capital in this case bears little or no 
relationship to the word ‘capital’ in the economic sense of the word209. As was highlighted in the 
previous chapter, creditors are interested in ‘capital’ in the economic sense of the word210.  
Jurisdictions like Malawi, which by virtue of their balance sheet solvency tests require 
distributions to be made out of surplus, are founded on the ‘trust fund doctrine’211. Cox and 
Hazen explain the inefficiency of the trust fund doctrine: 
‘The “trust fund doctrine” that is at the core of the corporate statutes’ embrace of the concept of legal capital 
is primarily a rule against the wrongful withdrawal of assets that should be retained by the corporation for the 
protection of creditors.  
There is in fact no true trust fund at all, but only a legal prohibition against withdrawals of corporate 
assets that reduce the margin of safety for creditors. The margin so identified, however, has no intrinsic 
relationship to the variables that subject creditors to improper risks or prejudice some of the shareholders 
themselves…’212 [Sic]  
Also noting the reliance on the meaningless trust fund legal doctrine by statutes that 
restrict dividend payments to surplus, Gibson states that for creditors the governing standard in 
the determination of surplus, should be ‘value of assets’213. However, there is an anomaly in that 
the amount of net assets and hence the amount of surplus and hence the permissible source of 
dividends does not rest on the realizable values, as the trust fund doctrine presupposes, but on an 
accumulation of liabilities214. Further, there is also an inefficiency with balance sheet solvency 
tests that employ stated capital/surplus benchmarks which stems from the fact that distributions 
are never and can never be paid out of surplus, they are paid out of assets; surplus cannot be 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
208 Cox and Hazen op cit (n39) 487. 
209 Economists define ‘capital’ as assets of the business used to acquire additional worth. This can be contrasted to 
‘capital’ in the legal sense which is the amount the business’ proprietors agree to invest in the business. See 
generally Maurer School of Law: Indiana University ‘The Corporate Creditor and Legislative Restrictions on the 
Distribution of Capital’ (1955) Vol 30 Issue 2 Art 6 Indiana Law Journal 239. See also, Cox and Hazen op cit (n39) 
501.     
210 J Armour Legal Capital op cit (n91) 8.    
211 See, GD Gibson ‘Surplus, So What? The Model Act Modernized’ (1962) 17.3 The Business Lawyer 476 to 499 
at 486. 
212 Ibid 503. 
213 GD Gibson op cit (n211) 487.  
214 Ibid 488 – 489. 
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distributed, assets are distributed215. In the words of Manning, ‘no one ever received a package 
of surplus for Christmas’216.  
In view of the foregoing, an examination of the approach of three jurisdictions (New York, 
Delaware and Canada) that employ stated or legal capital in their balance sheet tests would not 
go amiss in an attempt to appreciate the efficacy of such an approach. 
 
3.1.2.1 New York Business Corporation Law 
Section 510(b) of the New York Business Corporation Law regulates distributions. It reads as 
follows: 
‘Dividends may be declared or paid and other distributions  may  be made  either  (1)  out  of  surplus,  so  
that  the  net  assets  of the corporation remaining after such declaration,  payment  or  distribution  shall  at  
least  equal the amount of its stated capital, or (2) in case there shall be no such surplus, out of its net profits  
for  the  fiscal  year in which the dividend is declared and/or the preceding fiscal year…’217 
 
The New York statute provides a definition of stated capital218. The interpretation of the 
definition is that stated capital in New York’s case fixes the margin of net assets or value that 
must be retained in the business and restricts the distribution of assets to the shareholders219.  
Statutes that employ stated capital in the determination of balance sheet solvency prescribe 
stated capital as the margin of safety for the benefit of the company’s creditors220. In effect, New 
York is still founded on the ‘trust fund doctrine’221. New York Business Corporation Law 
continues to use the inefficient legal capital mechanism by incorporating stated capital in the 
determination of balance sheet solvency as a restriction for dividend and other distributions. 
                                                          
215 See Manning and Hanks op cit (n3) 37. 
216 Ibid 38. 
217 Ibid. 
218 See s102 (a) (12) of the New York Business Corporation Law. 
219 Cox and Hazen state that a corporation’s legal capital is the same as the corporation’s stated capital. According 
to a New York case Randall –v- Bailey, 23 N.Y.S.2d 173, legal capital is an amount that measures the margin of net 
assets or value that is to be retained in the business as against withdraws  in favour of the shareholders. See Cox and 
Hazen op cit (n39) 502. 
220 Ibid. 
221 See GD Gibson (n211).  
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With respect to the protection of creditors, there are no particular advantages set out in the 
literature to justify the New York stated capital/surplus approach222.  
 
3.1.2.2 Delaware General Corporation Law      
Under section 170(a) of the Delaware General Corporation Law dividends may be declared out 
of: (1) surplus, or (2) in case there is no surplus, net profits for the fiscal year in which the 
dividend is declared and/or the preceding fiscal year. Surplus is defined as the excess of the net 
assets of the corporation over the amount so determined to be capital223. Net assets means the 
amount by which total assets exceed total liabilities224. Statutory ‘capital’ is determined as 
follows: (1) for par value stock, the par value of the consideration received for the issuance of 
such stock constitutes capital unless the board determines that a greater amount of the 
consideration received for such stock shall constitute capital; and (2) for stock with no par value, 
the entire consideration received for the issuance of such stock constitutes capital unless the 
directors, at the time of issuing shares for cash, or within 60 days after issuing shares for 
consideration other than cash, allocate a smaller portion of the total consideration to capital225. 
The law of stated capital and pay-out restrictions in Delaware is the product of a 
continuing conflict between an urge to protect creditors by a simplistic mechanical rule, on the 
one hand, and on the other, the pressures of business reality226. In terms of a simplistic 
mechanical rule, Delaware is a balance sheet surplus jurisdiction like New York227. The funds 
available for a lawful dividend under the ‘surplus test’ are calculated by subtracting the current 
value of total liabilities and the corporation’s capital from the current value of the corporation’s 
total assets228. The limitation is that the distribution must not impair the corporation’s capital229. 
This means Delaware being the most important source of corporations law in the US continues 
                                                          
222 See generally RA Booth ‘Capital Requirements in United States Corporation Law’ (2005) Working Paper Series 
Paper 102. Accessed from digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/…/ on 17th January, 2017. See also RS Stevens ‘New 
York Business Corporation Law of 1961’ (1962) 47 Cornell L. Rev. 141. See also CA Peterson and NW Hawker 
‘Does Corporate Law Matter? Legal Capital Restrictions on Stock Distributions’ (1998) 31 Akron Law Review 1.  
223 Section 154 of the Delaware General Corporations Law.  
224 Ibid. 
225 See Robinson & Cole LLP ‘Issuing Dividends under Delaware Corporate Law’. Accessed from 
www.mnat.com/files/1 - 519 - 2507.pdf. Accessed on 17th January 2017. 
226 Manning and Hanks op cit (n3) 82. 
227 Business reality is covered by the concept of nimble dividends in Delaware which is not the subject of this thesis. 
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to follow traditional legal capital rules, albeit with some important twists230. However, as was 
the case with the New York, there are no particular advantages for creditors that are set out in 
the literature to justify the balance sheet surplus approach adopted by the state of Delaware231.  
 
3.1.2.3 The Canadian solvency and liquidity test  
In terms of statutory language, section 42 of the Canada Business Corporations Act (‘CBCA’)232 
which regulates dividends is quiet similar to the Malawian solvency test provision.  It reads as 
follows: 
“A corporation shall not declare or pay a dividend if there are reasonable grounds for believing that  
(a) the corporation is, or would after the payment be, unable to pay its liabilities as they become due; or 
(b) the realizable value of the corporation’s assets would thereby be less than the aggregate of its liabilities 
and stated capital of all classes.”   
In Canada, stated capital represents the equity investment made by the shareholders in the 
corporation233. Canadian literature notes that stated capital has two distinct purposes – (a) 
protection of creditors; and (b) protection of shareholders234.  In terms of protection of creditors, 
the idea is that creditors look to the corporation’s stated capital as the measure of its security – 
the pool from which the corporation will pay its debts235.  
The solvency test is not only applicable to the declaration and payment of dividends under 
the Canadian law. The test is also available when a company wants to redeem its previously 
issued shares; purchase its own shares and reduce its share capital. Notably, the same equity 
solvency test applies to all company transactions but in terms of balance sheet solvency test, it 
varies depending on the nature of the transaction236. In a redemption, the balance sheet test is 
met if after the payment, the realizable value of the corporation’s assets exceeds the sum of the 
company’s liabilities and the amount required to pay for all shares ranking in priority to or 
equally with the shares being redeemed or purchased237. In a company transaction to acquire its 
                                                          
230 RA Booth op cit (n222) 18 – 21. 
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shares, the balance sheet test requires that after payment, the realizable value of the corporation’s 
assets must not be less than the sum of its liabilities and stated capital238.  
This balance sheet stated capital/surplus test for share repurchases has been said to be of 
particularly wide import in Canadian law because it prohibits the purchase of shares even where 
the shares that are being purchased are payable in priority to other shares of the corporation239. 
The usage of stated capital in the determination of balance sheet solvency is seen as a stricter 
restriction to corporate distributions240. 
 
3.1.2.4 What would be a better approach for Malawi? 
Seemingly, the stated capital/surplus balance sheet test in Canada is used because it is viewed as 
a stricter test than the loose net assets test (whether the realizable value of the corporation’s 
assets would be less than the aggregate of its liabilities)241 or the test that makes reference to the 
availability of assets to settle the liabilities of preferential shareholders242.  
If the usage of stated capital/surplus restrictions stems out of the need to provide a more 
stringent test to corporate distributions than the modern net assets test exemplified by the 
Revised Model Act, then, on the one hand, it is understandable. In South Africa, where the 
solvency element is satisfied whenever the assets equal the liabilities following a distribution 
and no provision is made for a solvency margin except in limited circumstances where the 
liquidation preferences of preference shareholders must be taken into account243, it has been said 
that a comparison with the solvency requirements applicable in other jurisdictions shows that the 
current South African test is relatively lenient and out of step with international trends244.  
On the other hand, instead of utilizing the system of stated capital/surplus which is 
criticized as archaic245, the state of California whose Corporations Code eliminated the concepts 
of surplus and stated capital as the basis for permitting distributions offers a modern approach 
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for providing somewhat greater protection to creditors than the bare net assets test. Section 500 
of the California Corporations Code (as amended in 2011) applies two alternative balance-sheet 
restrictions ie retained earnings test and adjusted net worth test. Each of these alternatives 
requires a margin of assets over liabilities subsequent to the distribution:  
‘a corporation may make a distribution if the board of directors determines either;  
(1) the amount of retained earnings of the corporation immediately prior to the distribution equals or exceeds 
the sum of (A) the amount of the proposed distribution plus (B) the preferential dividends arrears amount; or 
(2) immediately after the distribution, the sum of the corporation’s assets would equal or exceed the sum of 
its liabilities plus preferential rights amount’
246.  
Interestingly, even before the 2011 amendments in California, their Corporations Code 
which provided somewhat two rigid alternative balance sheet restrictions, thus, retained earnings 
test and the asset-liabilities ratio test, was seen by prominent company law academics as a better, 
less lenient approach than the flexible net assets test247. 
Therefore, the current solvency test as defined in the new Companies Act, 2013, because 
of the balance sheet solvency element which utilizes the stated capital/surplus approach, is 
inadequate as a mechanism for protecting creditors and is out of step with international standards 
as it is founded on the meaningless trust fund doctrine. A better approach would be to follow the 
approach taken in the amended California Corporations Code, 2011 which is stricter than the net 
assets test as California provides for a solvency margin for the benefit of creditors. 
 
3.2 CONCLUSION 
The definition of the solvency test in section 2 (5) of the Companies Act, 2013 includes the 
equity solvency test as well as the balance sheet solvency test. For distributions and other 
company transactions to be legal under the Act, both tests must be met. 
The equity insolvency element as defined in the Act involves a cash flow prediction. 
Notably, an examination of the literature from other jurisdictions on the meaning of the equity 
insolvency test leads to a conclusion that the equity insolvency test as enacted in the new 
Companies Act, 2013 is in line with good international standards. 
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The balance sheet solvency test, on the other hand, permits distributions only to the extent there 
is a surplus (surplus refers to the amount by which assets of a company exceed its liabilities and 
stated capital). The usage of stated capital in the determination of balance sheet solvency in the 
Companies Act, 2013 is odd considering that stated capital bears no necessary relationship to 
capital in the economic sense of the word.  Further, jurisdictions like Malawi which provide for 
distributions to be made out of surplus only are founded on the trust fund doctrine which 
doctrine is criticised for being insufficient and meaningless when it comes to protecting 
creditors. All in all, there is no justification in the literature for employing stated capital/surplus 
limitations when measuring the legality of distributions.  
However, in other jurisdictions, it has been stated that stated capital/surplus restrictions are 
stricter than the net assets balance sheet tests. In that case, if the intention in Malawi is to 
provide for a stricter solvency test regime, the way to do so should not be to use the stated 
capital/surplus restriction. Indeed, the state of California (its law as amended in 2011) which 
provides for an alternative retained earnings/adjusted net worth balance sheet test would be a 
better example for Malawi to follow. 
In view of the foregoing, it is submitted that the current solvency test as defined in the 
Malawian Companies Act, 2013, because of the balance sheet solvency element which utilises 
the stated capital/surplus approach founded on the meaningless trust fund doctrine, will not 












CHAPTER FOUR:  OTHER MATTERS TO CONSIDER IN THE APPLICATION OF 
THE SOLVENCY TEST IN THE COMPANIES ACT, 2013. 
4.0 INTRODUCTION 
Chapter three has mainly looked at the interpretation of the equity insolvency and balance sheet 
solvency tests provided in paragraphs (a) and (b) of section 2(5) of the Companies Act, 2013. 
This chapter looks at the following other aspects of the solvency test that may raise legal 
interpretation issues in the operation of the test under the Companies Act, 2013: (i) the assets 
and liabilities that should be included and their valuation; (ii) the time when the test should be 
considered and satisfied; and (iii) the manner in which the test should be applied.  
Other jurisdictions, in their definition of the solvency test, provide for the circumstances 
where a qualification applies in favour of preferential shareholders248. The Companies Act, 2013 
does not provide for preferential rights in its definition of the solvency test. This chapter 
therefore does not discuss that aspect.  
 
4.1 ASSETS AND LIABILITIES AND THEIR VALUATION 
The Companies Act, 2013 provides some guidance on how to make asset and liability 
determinations for purposes of assessing a company’s equity or balance sheet solvency. The Act 
in its section 2(5) (c) states that other than in relation to compromises, reconstructions and 
takeovers in determining whether the value of a company’s assets is greater than the value of its 
liabilities, the board may take into account: (i) in the case of a public or a private company, the 
most recent financial statements of the company prepared in accordance with IFRS; and (ii) a 
valuation of assets and estimates of liabilities that are reasonable in the circumstances249. A 
number of issues come up when one attempts to analyse this provision. 
First and foremost, the size of any deficiency between assets and liabilities of a company is 
a factor that can be taken into account when ascertaining the liquidity of a company and 
information on this deficiency will ordinarily be recorded in the financial statements250. To that 
                                                          
248 See for example, section 4(2)(c) of the South African Companies Act, 2008; section 52(4) of the New Zealand 
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extent, section 2(5) (c) of the Companies Act, 2013 applies both to equity solvency and balance 
sheet solvency tests251. Section 2(5) (c) of the Act, by merely providing that the board may take 
into account financial statements prepared in accordance with IFRS in determining whether the 
value of the company’s assets is greater than the value of its liabilities, is not very helpful as a 
matter of guidance for the board especially when assessing a company’s equity solvency.  
Financial statements are a collection of reports about a company’s financial results, 
financial condition and cash flows252. However, the application of the equity insolvency test 
essentially amounts to a prediction of the company’s cash flow over a period of time253. Further, 
whether a company is unable to pay its debts as they fall due is always a question of fact to be 
decided as a matter of commercial reality in the light of all the circumstances of the case, and not 
merely by looking at the accounts and making mechanical comparison of assets and liabilities254. 
Considering the foregoing characteristics of equity solvency, it is quiet odd that the way section 
2(5) (c) has been drafted, it gives leeway for one to read the provision as giving power or 
discretion to directors to merely rely on information recorded in financial statements when 
applying the equity insolvency test255. If that indeed is the case then the provision is limited and 
out of step with international trends. The liquidity test should be based on not only financial 
information contained in the company’s records and statements, but also on reasonably 
foreseeable financial circumstances (my emphasis) that may affect the company’s ability to pay 
its debts256.  
It is easy to submit that Malawi should clarify its law and perhaps follow the South 
African approach (with the suggested amendments by Van der Linde)257. However, there is a 
marked difference in the way the Malawian section 2(5) (c) and section 4(2) (a) of the South 
                                                          
251 This point is made by keeping in mind that the balance sheet test under the Companies Act, 2013 is satisfied 
whenever the value of the assets of the company exceed the value of its liabilities and stated capital. 
252Financial statements normally include: balance sheet – which shows the company’s assets, liabilities and 
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and financial activities for the reporting period; and statement of cash flows – which shows changes in the 
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www.accountingtools.com/definition-financial-statements. Accessed on 31 January, 2017. 
253 In South Africa one predicts the company’s cash flow situation over the ensuing 12 months. See s 4(1) (b) of the 
Companies Act, 2008. See also the Official Comment to s6.40 of the Revised Model Act. 
254 See R Jooste ‘Corporate Finance’ in FHI Cassim et al op cit (n22) 278. 
255 The provision states that the board may… ‘may’ denotes power or discretion. 
256 K Van der Linde op cit (n4) 230.  
257 For example Van der Linde suggests that the phrase ‘considering all reasonably foreseeable financial 
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African Companies Act, 2008 are drafted258. The South African law is mandatory in its wording 
whilst the Malawian law gives directors power or discretion259. If the idea in the Malawian Act 
was to give directors discretion in determining whether the value of the company’s assets 
exceeds the value of its liabilities, then section 6.40 (d) of the Revised Model Act would be a 
better example for Malawi. The said section 6.40 (d) reads as follows: 
‘the board of directors may base a determination that a distribution is not prohibited under subsection (c) 
either on financial statements prepared on the basis of accounting practices and principles that are reasonable 
in the circumstances or on a fair valuation or other method that is reasonable in the circumstances.’ 
The Official Comment to section 6.40 notes that under this provision the determination of 
a corporation’s assets and liabilities and the choice of the permissible basis on which to do so are 
left to the judgment of its board of directors260. Hanks highlights that the solvency test in section 
6.40 (c) of the Revised Model Act would be improved if the Act afforded an opportunity for the 
board to consider ‘all reasonably foreseeable financial circumstances of the company’ (my 
emphasis) in the same manner as the South African Companies Act, 2008261. In this regard, if 
Malawi were to largely adopt the Revised Model Act’s section 6.40 (d) with a bit of 
modification, it could mean that directors in Malawi have discretion to base the determination of 
assets and liabilities on financial statements prepared on the basis of accounting practices (IFRS) 
and principles that are reasonable in the circumstances (this last part could be amended by 
replacing it with ‘all reasonably foreseeable financial circumstances of the company’). 
The Official Comment goes further to highlight that when making a judgment under 
section 6.40 (d), the board may rely upon opinions, reports, or statements, including financial 
statements and other financial data prepared or presented by public accountants or others262. 
Similarly, when making a solvency and liquidity enquiry in South Africa, the board is at liberty 
to rely on others, unless the board has actual knowledge, or ought in the circumstances to have 
had grounds for the suspicion, that such reliance is unwarranted263. This will certainly be the 
case in Malawi. Directors will be at liberty to rely on the opinions of other people such as 
                                                          
258 Section 4(2) (a) of the Companies Act, 2008 must be read together with the introductory text to section 4(1) 
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officers or employees of the company, legal counsel, public accountants or any other person 
whom the directors believe is competent enough to handle the matters under enquiry264.     
Secondly, section 2(5) (c) of the Companies Act, 2013 goes further to state that when 
determining whether the value of the company’s assets is greater than the value of its liabilities 
the board may take into account a valuation of assets and estimates of liabilities that are 
reasonable in the circumstances. The language of this provision is somehow similar to the 
language used in section 4(2) (b) of the New Zealand Companies Act, 1993. The said provision 
reads as follows: 
‘(2) Without limiting sections 52 and 55 (3), in determining for the purposes of this Act whether the value of 
a company’s assets is greater than the value of a company’s liabilities, including contingent liabilities, the 
directors –  
… (b) may rely on valuations of assets or estimates of liabilities that are reasonable in the 
circumstances.’ (My emphasis) [Sic]  
New Zealand literature highlights that when it comes to the valuation of assets the main 
issue that arises concerns the meaning of ‘value’ of the company’s assets. The company’s assets 
should be valued on the basis of their market value, rather than the historical cost that might be 
recorded in the company’s financial accounts265. Further, market value should be assessed on a 
going concern basis, rather than on a liquidation basis266. This is because a liquidation basis of 
valuation would assume the very thing that the solvency test is intended to assess267. The 
meaning of ‘value’ as determined in New Zealand is similar to the meaning determined in the 
US. The Official Comment to the Revised Model Act notes that the statute authorizes departures 
from historical cost accounting and sanctions the use of appraisal and current value methods to 
                                                          
264 The Companies Act, 2013 has actually codified the business judgment rule. Section 220 (4) of the Act reads:  
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the duties of his office honestly, in good faith and in the best interests of the company; and (b) the degree of care, 
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265 Cudden –v- Rodley CA67/99, per Richardson P, Gault and Henry JJ. This case is cited in Watts, Campbell & 
Hare ‘Company Law in New Zealand’ 1ed (2011) 222. 




determine the amount available for distributions268. Thus, the ordinary meaning of ‘value’ seems 
to be settled and any person making a valuation of assets and liabilities for purposes of solvency 
in Malawi should be properly guided. 
Notably, the Malawian Companies Act, 2013 does not make any reference to contingent 
liabilities as liabilities that must be included in the determination of the value of liabilities. The 
Companies Act, 2013 would do well to further guide directors on the issue of contingent 
liabilities in the same vein as South Africa and New Zealand have. In New Zealand, the 
Companies Act, 1993 makes explicit reference to contingent liabilities and goes further to 
prescribe the method for valuation of contingent liabilities for directors269. The South African 
Companies Act, 2008 actually goes further to provide for contingent assets. Its section 4(2)(b)(i) 
states that the board or any other person applying the solvency and liquidity test to a company 
must consider a fair valuation of the company’s assets and liabilities, including any reasonably 
foreseeable contingent assets and liabilities. Van der Linde perhaps crucially gives the reason 
why statutes such as the New Zealand and South African Companies Acts explicitly mention or 
include contingent liabilities (in the South African case, contingent assets as well). She 
comments as follows: 
‘In accounting terms, contingent liabilities are possible liabilities and must be distinguished from 
“provisions”, which are existing liabilities of uncertain timing or amount. Similarly, contingent assets are 
assets that the company may acquire in the future.  
It is important to note that contingent assets and contingent liabilities are not required to be 
reflected in financial statements in terms of international accounting standards and international 
financial reporting standards, and will also not appear in accounting records…”270 (my emphasis) 
[Sic] 
Considering that section 2(5) (c) of the Companies Act, 2013 merely refers directors to 
financial statements prepared in accordance with IFRS when making asset and liability 
determinations and considering that contingent assets and contingent liabilities are not required 
to be reflected in financial statements in terms of international accounting standards and IFRS, 
and will also not appear in accounting records, a refinement of the new Malawian Act to provide 
for contingent liabilities and contingent assets in the determination of assets and liabilities as 
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well as possibly providing for the method of valuation of such contingent assets and contingent 
liabilities would be most appropriate for Malawi.  
 
4.2 TIME AT WHICH THE SOLVENCY TEST IS APPLIED 
When examining the application of the solvency test it is necessary to consider the time at which 
the board must apply the solvency test271. Importantly, one must distinguish between the time 
when the test should be considered and the time when the test should be satisfied272.  
 
4.2.1 When should the test be considered? 
Section 98(2) of the Companies Act, 2013 provides on board authorization of distributions. It 
states that a board may authorize a distribution at such time and of such amount as it thinks fit, 
provided it is of the opinion that the company shall, upon the distribution being made, satisfy the 
solvency test. In most jurisdictions, authorization of distributions is usually the first step that a 
company will go through in making a distribution273. This is the case in New Zealand where 
section 52(1) of the Companies Act, 1993 reads as follows: 
‘The board of a company that is satisfied on reasonable grounds that the company will, immediately after the 
distribution, satisfy the solvency test may … authorize a distribution by the company at a time, and of an 
amount, and to any shareholders it thinks fit.’ [Sic] 
It is interesting to note the similarity between section 52(1) of the New Zealand 
Companies Act, 1993 and section 98(2) of the Companies Act, 2013. It is further interesting to 
note how the said section 52(1) has been interpreted. Van der Linde highlights that under this 
provision the board has to consider the financial restrictions at the time of authorization and be 
satisfied that the company will be solvent and liquid immediately after the distribution274. 
Therefore, it is not the financial position at the time of authorization that is considered, but the 
prospective position at the time of payment (my emphasis)275.  
Considering the similarity between the Malawian and the New Zealand law, directors in 
Malawi must consider the test at the time of authorization of a distribution but in doing so they 
                                                          
271 Watts, Campbell and Hare op cit (n265) 223. 
272 K Van der Linde op cit (n4) 233. 
273 See Watts, Campbell and Hare op cit (n265) 223. See also s6.40 (a) of the Revised Model Act.  




must look at the prospective financial position at the time of payment as the determining factor 
on whether to effect a distribution. 
 
4.2.2 When should the test be satisfied?  
In a sense, the preceding discussion already answers this question. The general requirement 
under the Companies Act, 2013 is that the solvency test must be satisfied upon completing the 
distribution. Almost all of the different transactions that involve pay-outs to shareholders under 
the Act contain this general requirement. A company’s financial assistance in connection with 
the acquisition of its own shares is permitted if the board has previously resolved that 
‘immediately after giving the assistance, the company will satisfy the solvency test’276; a 
contract with a company for the acquisition by the company of its own shares is enforceable 
against it ‘except to the extent that the company would after performance of the contract fail to 
satisfy the solvency test’277; company purchase of its own shares is permitted to the extent that 
‘immediately after the purchase, it will satisfy the solvency test’278; shareholder discount 
schemes are only permitted ‘where the company satisfies the solvency test’279; and a company is 
prohibited from extinguishing or reducing a liability in respect of an amount unpaid on a share or 
reducing its stated capital unless ‘immediately after taking such action, the company will satisfy 
the solvency test’280. The approach taken under the Act as regards the determination of when 
should the test be satisfied with respect to the various company transactions seems to avoid the 
complex timing rules that proceed by distinguishing the various company transactions281. This 
approach is commendable.      
 
4.3 MANNER OF APPLICATION OF THE SOLVENCY TEST  
To analyse the manner of application of the solvency test under the Companies Act, 2013 the 
chapter specifically looks at two aspects of the test: (i) whether the test imposes an objective or 
                                                          
276 s124 (2) (c) Companies Act, 2013. 
277 Ibid s123 (1). 
278 Ibid ss109 (4) and 110(2) (a) (iv). 
279 Ibid s106 (3). 
280 Ibid s100 (5). 
281 See the approach taken by California in s166 of the California Corporations Code, New Zealand in ss52 and 56 
of the Companies Act, 1993; and the US in s6.40 (e) and (g) of the Revised Model Act. 
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subjective standard on the board of directors? And (ii) whether the test involves a formal or an 
informal procedure? 
 
4.3.1 Does the test impose an objective or subjective standard? 
Under section 98(2) of the Companies Act, 2013 board authorization for a distribution may be 
given only if the board is of the opinion that the company will satisfy the solvency test upon 
making the distribution (my emphasis). The Act imposes a subjective standard for directors282. 
However, directors ought to base their subjective beliefs or opinions on reasonable grounds. This 
is the language that is used in the provisions that detail out the specific company transactions 
effecting distributions283.  
The fact that the determination of the solvency test incorporates a subjective standard 
which directors must meet is further highlighted by section 107(2) of the Act which provides on 
the recovery of unlawful distributions from shareholders and liability of directors. The said 
provision states that where, in relation to a distribution made to a shareholder, the procedure for 
payment of dividends has not been followed or reasonable grounds for believing that the 
company would satisfy the solvency test (in relation to share repurchases or financial assistance) 
did not exist at the time the certificate was signed, directors who signed the certificate are 
personally liable for the distribution which cannot be recovered from shareholders (my 
emphasis). The Companies Act, 2013 has therefore prescribed a lower standard for directors 
which should be easier to meet. 
 
4.3.2 Is it a formal or informal procedure? 
Section 98(3) of the Companies Act, 2013 provides that directors who vote in favour of a 
distribution must sign a certificate stating that, in their opinion, the company will, upon the 
distribution being made, satisfy the solvency test. This requirement for a formal solvency 
                                                          
282 ‘Subjective’ means related to or based on beliefs, attitudes and opinions instead of verifiable evidence.  See, 
Black’s Law Online Dictionary, 2ed. Accessed from http://thelawdictionary.org/subjective/ on 8 February, 2017.  
283 For example, s100 (5) prohibits a company from reducing its stated capital unless there are reasonable 
grounds on which the directors may determine that, immediately after taking such action, the company will 
satisfy the solvency test; s109 (4) prohibits a company from making any payment for the acquisition of its own 
shares where there are reasonable grounds for believing that the company would after making the payment fail 
to satisfy the solvency test. See also s106 (3) of the Act.  
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certificate is in line with international standards284. The law in New Zealand for example is 
almost the same as the law in Malawi. Section 52(2) of the Companies Act, 1993 reads as 
follows: 
‘The directors who vote in favour of a distribution must sign a certificate stating that, in their opinion, the 
company will, immediately after the distribution, satisfy the solvency test and the grounds for that 
opinion.’ (My emphasis). 
The only difference between section 98(3) of the Companies Act, 2013 and section 52(2) 
of the Companies Act, 1993, is that the New Zealand 1993 Act adds the words ‘and the grounds 
for that opinion’. Directors in New Zealand are advised to not only take considerable care in 
determining the solvency position of the company before authorizing the distribution, but they 
should also ensure that they have systems in place to record the reasons for their decision, and 
the information and advice on which it is based285. The reason for such advice stems from a 
recognition of the fact that challenges to decisions to authorize distributions usually occur at a 
time when the company is in insolvent liquidation and a great deal of hindsight will be brought 
to bear in examining the director’s decision in those circumstances286. This advice can similarly 
be given to directors who sign solvency certificates under the Malawian 2013 Act despite the 
said Act not specifically requiring them to state the grounds for their opinion. It may be prudent 
for directors to follow such advice because signing the solvency certificate without reasonable 
grounds may expose them to personal liability under section 107(2) of the Companies Act, 2013 
(already highlighted in para 4.3.1 above). In any event, as highlighted earlier, directors’ opinion 
on solvency must be based on reasonable grounds.  
Further, in support of the requirement for a formal declaration, it has been stated that the 
declaration places a positive duty on directors and thus appears more likely to prevent unlawful 
distributions which may compromise the position of creditors and shareholders287. This 
statement cannot be contested. Conversely, the disadvantage with the formal solvency 
declaration requirement is that compliance with this formality introduces a specific date for 
application of the financial restrictions and thus impairs flexibility288. Fortunately, the new 
Malawian Companies Act addresses this flexibility concern. Section 98(4) of the Act provides 
                                                          
284 South Africa, New Zealand, England all require a formal solvency declaration. 
285 Watts, Campbell and Hare op cit (n265) 228. 
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that where after a distribution is authorized and before it is made, the board ceases to be satisfied 
that the company will satisfy the solvency test after making the distribution, any distribution 
made will be deemed not to have been authorized. This provision offers a solution to dealing 
with a change in the financial situation of a company between the date of authorization by the 
directors and the date of implementation of a distribution289. The inclusion of section 98(4) 
discussed herein, is commendable. 
 
4.4 CONCLUSION 
Apart from the two separate elements of the solvency test, ie equity solvency and balance sheet 
solvency elements, legal interpretation issues may arise from the following other aspects of the 
test: (i) the assets and liabilities and their valuation; (ii) time when the test should be considered 
and satisfied; and (iii) manner of application of the test. 
 The determination of assets and liabilities is an exercise which is relevant for both equity 
and balance sheet solvency tests. For purposes of the equity solvency test, the difference 
between assets and liabilities of a company is a factor that may be considered. To that extent, 
when making a determination of which assets and liabilities of the company to consider so as 
examine the difference between them for purposes of the equity solvency test, directors should 
not only look at financial statements but should also consider all reasonably foreseeable financial 
circumstances of the company. The Companies Act, 2013 merely refers directors to financial 
statements prepared in accordance with IFRS. The Act is limited in this respect. 
Further, the Companies Act, 2013 does not provide for contingent assets or contingent 
liabilities to be taken into account when making asset and liability determinations. This is so 
despite the fact that in terms of accounting standards and IFRS, financial statements and other 
accounting records are not required to reflect contingent assets and contingent liabilities. The 
Act is out of step with international trends. 
As for valuation of assets and liabilities, issues revolve around the meaning of ‘value’ of 
the company’s assets. Value of the company’s assets means the current market value of the 
assets determined on a going concern basis.  
                                                          
289 See also Van der Linde’s discussion on New Zealand’s approach which is quiet similar to s98 (4) discussed 
herein. Ibid 238 – 239. 
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A proper reading of the Act demonstrates that directors must consider the test at the time of 
authorisation but in doing so must keep in mind that it is not the financial position at the time of 
authorisation that is considered but the prospective position at the time of payment. Generally, 
the Act provides that the test should be satisfied upon completing the distribution. 
Finally, the Act imposes a lower subjective standard for directors when determining 
whether the company will satisfy the solvency test upon completing a distribution. However, 
directors ought to be aware that the subjective standard must stem from reasonable grounds. 
Commendably, the Act prescribes a formal solvency procedure when making distributions. It 
may be prudent for directors to document, whenever they sign a solvency certificate, the grounds 
upon which they opine the company will satisfy the solvency test. Signing the solvency 
certificate without reasonable grounds may expose them to the risk of incurring a personal 


















CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION 
5.0 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter provides a summary of the different aspects of the operation of the solvency test as 
a financial restriction for distributions and other company transactions, followed by a conclusion 
and recommendations on the drafting of section 2 (5) of the Companies Act, 2013 which defines 
the solvency test. The recommendations are made by drawing lessons from the discussion in the 
preceding chapters and in doing so the paper addresses the concern(s) that precipitated the study. 
The chapter also suggests further areas of research that can be undertaken in order to 
further strengthen the solvency test regime in Malawi vis-à-vis creditor protection.  
 
5.1 SUMMARY OF THE DIFFERENT ASPECTS OF THE OPERATION OF THE    
SOLVENCY TEST AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE STUDY 
5.1.1 Design of the solvency test and creditor protection 
The manner in which the solvency test is defined in a particular statute has significant effects on 
whether in its operation the test affords adequate protection to the interests of creditors290.  
The solvency test as defined in section 2 (5) of the Companies Act, 2013 comprises of an 
equity solvency element as well as a balance sheet solvency element. Looking at the definition 
of the two separate elements of the test, it is notable that there are no fundamental issues which 
stem from a reading of the definition of the equity solvency test to suggest that in its operation it 
will not afford adequate protection to creditors291. The balance sheet solvency element on the 
other hand should have creditors concerned.  
Section 2 (5) of the Act provides for a stated capital/surplus balance sheet test292. Stated 
capital/surplus balance sheet tests utilise the arbitrary legal (stated) capital concept and are 
founded on the meaningless trust fund doctrine293. As a result of the enactment of the stated 
capital/surplus balance sheet test, this paper notes that the twin solvency test as currently enacted 
                                                          
290 See chapter 1 para 1.2. 
291 See chapter 3 para 3.1.1.  




in the Companies Act, 2013 will not afford adequate protection to creditors in its operation as a 
measuring rod for the legality of distributions under the Act294.     
 
5.1.2 Why twin solvency test? 
A fundamental question posed in the assessment of the twin solvency test is whether there a case 
for adopting the additional balance sheet test or indeed the equity insolvency test on its own is an 
adequate restriction295? The basic answer to this question is that the balance sheet and equity 
solvency tests have different theoretical justifications296. The balance sheet test gives advance 
recognition to the ultimate priority that creditors enjoy over shareholders upon dissolution of the 
company by preventing the company from favouring its shareholders through a partial 
liquidation and the equity insolvency test addresses the fundamental expectation of creditors to 
be paid on time and also fits in well with the representation a company is said to make when it 
incurs debt, namely that it reasonably expects to be able to pay as and when the debt becomes 
due297.  
The suggestion in this paper is that for jurisdictions like Malawi which have followed the 
US’ lead in adopting the twin solvency test, the different theoretical justifications alluded to 
herein provide an appropriate thesis for enacting the twin solvency test.  
 
5.1.3 The case for the solvency test in company law 
Looking at the theory of creditor protection in company law and the development of the 
solvency based regime, this paper settles on the point that the arguments against legal capital 
rules in one sense make out the case for the solvency test as an appropriate alternative to the 
legal capital rules when it comes to the protection of creditors against opportunistic shareholder 
behaviour298.  
The major criticism drawn out of economic theory is that the mandatory legal capital rules 
impose restrictions on companies which are ill-tuned to the needs of contracting parties 
                                                          
294 See chapter 3 para 3.1.2.4. 
295 See JJ Hanks (n168). 
296 See K Van der Linde op cit (n4) 226. 
297 Ibid. 
298 See chapter 2 para 2.1.1. 
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(creditors and the company) such that on the whole the costs of such restrictions outweigh their 
benefits299. 
 
5.1.4 Matters to consider when applying the solvency test 
Firstly, when making a determination of assets, liabilities and their valuation for purposes of the 
solvency test, assets of a company should be valued on the basis of their market value rather than 
the historical cost that might be recorded in the company’s financial accounts300. These assets 
should include contingent assets which are assets that the company may acquire in the future301. 
Similarly, liabilities should include contingent liabilities302. The reason for including contingent 
assets and contingent liabilities in the determination of assets and liabilities is that contingent 
assets and contingent liabilities are not required to be reported in financial statements and 
prescribing them in a statute should provide better guidance to directors when they apply the 
solvency test303. 
Secondly, solvency based standards are underpinned by personal liability attaching to 
directors in the event of irregularity304. It is therefore appropriate that even where statutes 
impose a lower standard for directors to meet when determining whether a company satisfies the 
solvency test, directors must have reasonable grounds for determining that a company will meet 




Firstly, there is no justification for using stated capital in the definition of the balance sheet 
solvency element as is the case under the Companies Act, 2013306. The explanation in the 
literature is that jurisdictions that continue to use the arbitrary stated capital figure in the 
computation of their balance sheet solvency test intend to provide for a stricter solvency test than 
                                                          
299 J Armour Share Capital and Creditor Protection op cit (n83) 377. 
300 Cudden –v- Rodley supra (n276). 
301 See chapter 4 para 4.1. 
302 These are possible liabilities and should be distinguished from provisions which are recorded in financial 
statements. Ibid. 
303 Ibid. 
304 E Ferran and L Chan Ho op cit (n2). 
305 See chapter 4 para 4.3.1 and 4.3.2. 
306 See chapter 3 para(s) 3.1.2.1, 3.1.2.2, and 3.1.2.3. 
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the net assets test307. Instead of utilising stated capital in its balance sheet solvency test, Malawi 
should follow the approach of California (2011 amended Corporations Code) where the law 
prescribes the retained earnings test and the adjusted net worth test308.  
Further, to avoid any ambiguities in the definition of the solvency test, the current 
introductory text read together with paragraphs (a) and (b) of section 2 (5) of the Companies 
Act, 2013 should also be amended. An amended section 2 (5) (a) of the Act could read as 
follows: 
‘(a) For the purposes of this Act, a company satisfies the solvency test if – 
(i) the company is able to pay its debts as they become due in the normal course of business; and 
(ii) the amount of retained earnings of the company, immediately prior to the distribution, equals or 
exceeds the sum of – 
(aa) the amount of the proposed distribution plus; 
(bb) the preferential dividends arrears amount; or 
(iii) the value of the company’s assets is greater than the sum of – 
(aa) the value of its liabilities; and  
(bb) the preferential rights amount.’ (My emphasis) 
The usage of the retained earnings test as well as the adjusted net worth test provides for a 
solvency margin, thus a stricter solvency test for regulating distributions. 
Secondly, for purposes of determination of assets and liabilities and their valuation in the 
application of the solvency test, the Act should provide that contingent assets and contingent 
liabilities must be taken into account by the board. Further, the equity solvency element of the 
test should be based on reasonably foreseeable financial circumstances of the company. An 
amended section 2 (5) (b) of the Act could read as follows: 
‘(b)  other than in relation to compromises, reconstructions and takeovers, in determining whether the value 
of a company’s assets is greater than the value of its liabilities, including contingent assets and 
contingent liabilities, the board may take into account – 
(i) in the case of a public company or a private company, apart from the most recent financial statements 
of the company prepared in accordance with IFRS, all reasonably foreseeable financial 
circumstances of the company; and 
                                                          
307 See the discussion in para 3.1.2.3 of this paper. 
308 Section 500 of the California Corporations Code. 
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(ii) a valuation of assets and estimates of liabilities that are reasonable in the circumstances.’ (my 
emphasis) 
Finally, in line with the amendments proposed herein, the remaining paragraph of section 2 
(5) of the Act should be amended to read in this manner: 
‘(c) for the purposes of determining whether the value of the compromise, reconstruction or take-over 
company’s assets is greater than the value of its liabilities and the preferential rights amount, including 
contingent assets and contingent liabilities, the directors of each compromise, reconstruction or take over 
company – 
  (i)  shall have regard to – 
(aa) financial statements that are prepared in accordance with IFRS and that are prepared as if the 
compromise, reconstruction or take over had become effective; and 
(bb) all other reasonably foreseeable financial circumstances that the directors know or ought to 
know would affect, or may affect, the value of the compromise, reconstruction or take over 
company’s assets and the value of its liabilities;  
     (ii) may rely on valuations of assets or estimates of liabilities that are reasonable in the circumstances.’ 
(My emphasis) 
Admittedly, whilst this paper proposes the usage of the retained earnings test together with 
the adjusted net worth test following the approach of California, further research could be done 
to examine the effectiveness of the retained earnings/adjusted net worth test vis-à-vis how it 
operates in providing a solvency margin, thus a stricter test than the approach used in South 
Africa, New Zealand or under the Revised Model Act309.  Further, it may also be prudent to 
investigate the efficacy of providing a method of valuation of contingent assets and contingent 
liabilities in the manner which the New Zealand Companies Act, 1993 has provided310, instead 
of merely leaving it to directors to ‘take into account a valuation of assets and estimates of 
liabilities that are reasonable in the circumstances’311. Thus, there is an opportunity to further 
strengthen the solvency based regime under the Malawian Companies Act, 2013. 
To conclude, this paper suggests an amendment to section 2 (5) of the Companies Act, 
2013 which defines the solvency test. In its current reading (the current definition of solvency 
test is reproduced in full in chapter 3 paragraph 3.1) the test will not afford adequate protection 
                                                          
309 The more common modern approaches. 
310 See section 4 of the New Zealand Companies Act, 1993. 
311 This is the approach in section 2 (5) of the Companies Act, 2013. 
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to creditors during company distributions and other company transactions. The amended section 
2 (5) of the Act should read as follows: 
‘(a) For the purposes of this Act, a company satisfies the solvency test if – 
(i) the company is able to pay its debts as they become due in the normal course of business; and 
(ii) the amount of retained earnings of the company, immediately prior to the distribution, equals or 
exceeds the sum of – 
(aa) the amount of the proposed distribution plus; 
(bb) the preferential dividends arrears amount; or 
(iii) the value of the company’s assets is greater than the sum of – 
(aa) the value of its liabilities; and  
(bb) the preferential rights amount. 
(b)  other than in relation to compromises, reconstructions and takeovers, in determining whether the value of 
a company’s assets is greater than the value of its liabilities, including contingent assets and contingent 
liabilities, the board may take into account – 
(i) in the case of a public company or a private company, apart from the most recent financial statements 
of the company prepared in accordance with IFRS, all reasonably foreseeable financial circumstances 
of the company; and 
(ii) a valuation of assets and estimates of liabilities that are reasonable in the circumstances. 
(c) for the purposes of determining whether the value of the compromise, reconstruction or take-over 
company’s assets is greater than the value of its liabilities and the preferential rights amount, including 
contingent assets and contingent liabilities, the directors of each compromise, reconstruction or take over 
company – 
 (i)  shall have regard to – 
(aa) financial statements that are prepared in accordance with IFRS and that are prepared as if the 
compromise, reconstruction or take over had become effective; and 
(bb) all other reasonably foreseeable financial circumstances that the directors know or ought to know 
would affect, or may affect, the value of the compromise, reconstruction or take over company’s 
assets and the value of its liabilities;  
(ii) may rely on valuations of assets or estimates of liabilities that are reasonable in the circumstances.’ 
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